

THE CLERGY REVIEW

A MAGAZINE FOR THE CLERGY

PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

VOLUME II.

JULY—DECEMBER, 1931.

Proprietors

"THE UNIVERSE,"

(Associated Catholic Newspapers, 1912, Ltd.)

1, Arundel Street, London, W.C.2

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ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND SOCIAL PRACTICE

BY THE REV. LEWIS WATT, S.J., B.Sc.(Econ.)

SOME people there always are, especially in this pragmatic country of ours, to whom an investigation of principles seems very like mere waste of time. This is particularly true of ardent social reformers, anxious to apply legislative remedies to social ills, and fearful lest action be postponed while academic minds engage in interminable discussions about the principles which should guide action. When a house is on fire, they argue, it is futile to detain the fire-engine until a self-appointed committee of pundits has examined the nature of water and its effects when applied to a flame. Let us have action, they cry, and leave theory to those who enjoy academic speculation; let us get to work at once to improve the conditions of society, to correct such-and-such an abuse, to introduce such-and-such a reform. But they fail to notice that their demand takes a great number of principles for granted. It assumes that it is within the power of men to improve social conditions, and that these conditions are not determined to be what they are by immutable natural laws (an assumption which not all would grant); it assumes that there is some kind of agreement as to what would be an improvement, though in fact there are fundamental differences of opinion on this question between socialists and individualists, employers and employed, landlord and tenant, protectionist and free-trader. It assumes other principles of psychology and ethics too, which it is unnecessary to detail.

The fact is that behind all action there is always conscious or unconscious theory. The lives of countless men, women and children have been and are being

influenced by social theories of which they have never heard, and I hope to show, in this paper, how economic principles, true or false, have affected social conditions in the past and are affecting them to-day; and at the same time to show how certain principles, maintained as most evidently true by those who held them, have been refuted by the inexorable logic of the facts. I shall also try to prove that the principles which, under the guidance of the Catholic Church, are accepted by Catholic social reformers are being forced upon the acceptance of people by the course of events, even though those people reject the authority of the Church and are ignorant of what her social principles are.

I might begin with the guild-system, and show how the guilds undermined their own power and influence by pursuing a selfish policy of exclusiveness opposed to the spirit of Christianity. But I prefer to trace the history of last century and to point out its repercussions on the present time. It is hardly necessary to recall that in the second half of the eighteenth century there began that change in economic and industrial methods which has been called "The Industrial Revolution." It began in England and spread to other countries only after a considerable lapse of time. Inventions of various kinds vastly increased the productive powers of England, and the Factory System sprang up to exploit them to the utmost. Unfortunately it was not merely the inventions that were exploited, but the inventors too, and the workers who had to make use of the inventions in the factories of the capitalists. The story of the employment of women and young children in the coal-mines and the factories, the tragedy of their long agony, is a familiar one, though its familiarity does not deaden the feeling of horror with which every decent person must regard it. As one reads it, one is driven to ask, How did the governing class in England tolerate it so long as it did? How did our rulers soothe their consciences? The answer is, By the principles of what was then called the New Political Economy.

This New Political Economy was the system which we now associate with the names of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and others of what is sometimes known as the Classical School of Economics. On the Continent, it is usually called the Liberal School, from the fact that its

main insistence was on liberty. This school may be said to have begun with the Physiocrats, a name taken from the title of a collection of the writings of the French doctor, Quesnay, which was published in 1765 by Dupont de Nemours and called *Physiocratie*. Quesnay had a large number of followers in France, and considerable influence on Adam Smith, who has been called the father of political economy in Great Britain. The Physiocrats were the children of their time and its philosophy. Disciples of the sceptic Voltaire and the visionary Rousseau, they accepted the dangerous principle that man, being essentially good, has only to follow the tendencies of his nature to arrive at happiness, and happiness on their lips meant the pleasures of this life and the satisfaction of the senses. If his bodily needs are gratified, he will be happy, and the function of economic life is to satisfy those needs to the utmost. Consequently they stressed the necessity of production of the greatest possible amount of material goods. The first thing required to secure this maximum of production was that the State should keep its hands off industry, and this they expressed in the well-known phrase, *Laissez-faire*. The State, they held, should confine itself to protecting the freedom of its citizens to make what contracts they pleased. The motive of self-interest, being left free play, would in their opinion secure the maximum welfare of society.

Thus were laid the foundations of that system of "natural liberty" which, defended by eminent economists in Great Britain after Adam Smith had lent it the weight of his authority in *The Wealth of Nations*, was eagerly adopted by the governing class and the employers with disastrous consequences to the workers and the poor. Adam Smith was more humane than his successors, and it may be true that his successors were more humane than the practical men of affairs who learned from them; but the net result to Great Britain was that wealth in the narrowest sense increased while the welfare of a large section of the population rapidly diminished.

Though there is no economist to-day who would be prepared to defend the system of natural liberty, there are many people who consciously or unconsciously believe in it. It is therefore worth while considering its main principles, as generally accepted in its heyday. It

maintained that the production of material goods should be relentlessly developed, and that this production is best secured when men are left to the free play of the motive of self-interest, each seeking his own individual good in the way that seems best to him. All laws and regulations tending to interfere with men's industrial and commercial freedom can do nothing but harm, and should be repealed as soon as possible. The world of industry and commerce would then be left to the free play of natural economic laws, and these would secure that the best results were obtained. Free competition between employers for markets would result in the survival of the fittest and in the lowest possible price being charged to the consumers. Free competition between workers for employment would result in stimulating their industry and hence their output, with the result of increasing the national wealth.

One could find a good deal to criticise in this theory, even apart from its practical results. Its assumption that natural economic laws will secure that the general welfare is best obtained when everyone seeks his own self-interest; its idea that those employers who survive competition are not merely the fittest to compete but the fittest from the point of view of national production; its omission to take into account the distribution of the wealth produced; all these and other points have been often discussed and their fallacy revealed.

But we are more concerned to consider the effect of these economic principles on the practice of the times. We need not pause to speculate about what effect they would have had if all the faint qualifications of Smith, Ricardo and Malthus had been as eagerly adopted by the governing class as was the general idea of their system, for in point of fact they were left out of account. The lesson which the economists were thought to have taught was that the industrialists must be given a free hand to do their best for themselves, and that any interference by the State would be harmful to national prosperity and useless to protect the workers. When at the end of the eighteenth century Pitt was asked to enforce the old statutes providing for the regulation of wages, he replied that "trade, industry and barter would always find their own level, and be impeded by regulations which violated their natural operation and deranged their proper

effect." Even Burke, in 1795, argued that the farmer, in his own interest, would see that "the labourer is well fed, and otherwise found with such necessaries of animal life as may keep the body in full force and the mind gay and cheerful." The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (the chairman was Brougham) urged the workers in 1831 "when there is too much labour in the market and wages are too low, do not combine to raise wages; but go out of the market. Leave the relations between wages and labour to equalise themselves. You can never be permanently kept down in wages by the profits of capital; for if the profits of capital are too high, the competition of other capital immediately comes in to set the matter right." When attempts were made, early in the nineteenth century, to pass legislation to forbid the use of children as chimney-sweeps, the House of Lords rejected it, and Lord Lauderdale argued that the matter should be left entirely "to the moral feelings of perhaps the most moral people on the face of the earth"; and when a new Bill was introduced to forbid the use of boys under ten or of girls, he said: "If the legislature attempted to lay down a moral code for the people, there was always a danger that every feeling of benevolence would be extirpated," and the Bill was rejected by the House of Lords.

Very soon the idea that interference with conditions of labour, especially wages, could not take place without doing as much injury to the workers as to industry at large hardened, under the influence of the Wage Fund theory, and the teachings of Malthus, into the belief that poverty and misery are inevitable, and that it is quite impossible to raise the general level of wages. To quote a writer who cannot be suspected of any desire to blacken the reputation of capitalism: "People were up against the so-called law of the wages-fund which seemed to say that capital at any time was fixed in amount, that labour's share of that capital was automatically fixed, and that any gain by one class must be at the expense of another class. It would therefore be clearly unfair for the government to help one class of workers at the expense of another. Moreover, people believed that there was a law of population, the discovery of which was ascribed to Malthus, by which any rise in the standard of comfort would result in earlier marriages and in more

children being born. These, it was held, would compete in their turn for work, wages would fall, and the result would be an intolerable struggle for employment." (Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions*.)

Fortunately for Great Britain, there were humanitarians who were not prepared to bow their knee before the New Political Economy, and who, acting on different principles, succeeded in passing legislation to protect the workers, though only after long and bitter struggles and in the teeth of prophecies of disaster from the economists. This is not the place to relate the history of the condition of the workers in the nineteenth century, or of the gradual progress of reform by legislation. That has been done over and over again, and can be found in any economic history of the period. Long hours of labour in factories and mines for men, women and children, at grossly insufficient wages and under conditions fatal alike to body and to spiritual health; the peasantry turned into an urban proletariat and the yeomanry destroyed; the population concentrating in towns which sprang up to house the factory-hands without any regulation by the Government or local authorities, and in which typhus and small-pox were chronic and cholera frequently broke out; graveyards so overcrowded that the dead poisoned the living; no system of sanitation, no water-supply laid on to houses; such were some of the results of the principles of *laissez-faire* when adopted in practice, and they were of themselves sufficient to refute those principles. But it was a refutation which cost a terrible price in terms of human degradation, suffering, misery, disease, death and sin. Who that considers the story of economic theory and industrial and political practice in Great Britain last century would venture to say that principles are of no importance in practice?

After brooding over the reports of the Royal Commissions which have recorded the history of early nineteenth century England for future generations to wonder at, Karl Marx, already a revolutionary and a communist, put forward in 1867 an interpretation of economic life and the laws that were supposed to rule it which, though superficially the very opposite of that put forward by the classical economists, was yet curiously like it in its fundamental assumptions. Marx was not a social reformer, and his followers scorn the term. To call an

opponent a "reformist" is for them a term of abuse. They are root-and-branch revolutionaries. In any State based on capitalism, they hold, the worker is necessarily exploited. His employer lives on the profit made by extracting surplus-value from the working-class. In pure Marxist theory, this is not a sign of any particular depravity on the part of the employing class, the capitalists. It is a necessary and inevitable result of capitalism. All history, including, of course, economic history, is governed by natural laws which determine the course of human actions and institutions as absolutely as the laws which regulate the course of the planets or the seasons. They are not the work of an omnipotent Creator, for Marxism is atheistic; nevertheless, these laws are working for a better state of things. By a necessary evolution, the class-State (dominated by the bourgeois, as Marx holds) and the capitalist system, in which he maintains the bourgeois exploits the proletariat, will pass away, and communism will reign in their stead, when there will be no private property and no government. Evolution is perhaps not quite the correct word, for it seems to imply a peaceful course of events, whereas progress for Marx takes place through a struggle between classes, between the exploited and the exploiters. "All history," he says, "is a record of class struggles." The outstanding event of this struggle to which he looks forward is the seizing of political power by the proletariat, who will set up a Dictatorship of the Proletariat and nationalise the land and other means of production, banking and transport, and establish "industrial armies, especially for agriculture." The result of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat will be the destruction of all class-distinctions, and then (to use Lenin's phrase) the State will "wither away" and the final stage of communism will be achieved when material goods are produced in such abundance that everyone will be able to draw from national warehouses whatever he requires, irrespective of the amount of work he has performed, and everyone will be happy.

It is not my purpose to examine Marxist socialism at any length here, but rather to see how it influences practice. Nevertheless, it is worth while pointing out that one of the most accredited spokesmen of the system frankly admits that the communist millennium may be

nothing more than a myth. After telling us that the State will wither away when people voluntarily work to the best of their ability without a view to reward and their labour is so productive that every citizen can take what he needs from the common stock, Lenin writes: "It has never entered the head of any Socialist to promise that the highest phase of Communism will actually arrive," though "the great Socialists" anticipate that it will. Until it does arrive, he tells us, the Socialists demand the strictest control by society and by the State of the quantity of labour and the quantity of consumption. (Lenin, *The State and Revolution*.)

The classical economists were not anti-religious in their writings. Rather they were unreligious. They left religion and the spiritual side of life out of account concentrating their attention on a fictitious "economic man," moved only by the motive of economic self-interest. The psychological mistake of this view has often been pointed out, but sufficient insistence has not been laid on the fact that the Physiocrats, the first defenders of *laissez-faire*, adopted the sceptical attitude of Voltaire towards religion, and that the materialistic trend of their system is to be accounted for in great measure by the materialism of their philosophy. On this point Marx and Marxism are in full agreement with them. In an oft-quoted phrase, Marx wrote, "Religion is the opium of the people," and the official handbook to communism tells us that "it is the task of the communist party to make this truth comprehensible to the widest possible circle of the labouring masses. . . Religion and communism are incompatible, both theoretically and practically. . . One who, while calling himself a communist, continues to cling to his religious faith . . . ceases thereby to be a communist." (*The A.B.C. of Communism*, published by the British Communist Party.)

The materialistic outlook on life implicit in the theories of the classical economists is explicit in Marxism. But the resemblance between the political economy which was used to justify the abuses of early capitalism and that which is behind the revolutionary socialist movement is even more striking when we consider the ideas of *laissez-faire* individualism and those of Marxist socialism about "economic laws." The great century of natural science was justified in its children. As we have seen, the

Physiocrats and the classical economists maintained that to attempt to interfere with the natural laws which govern men in their economic relations was positively harmful. Leave natural laws to operate in their own way, and they would lead mankind to prosperity. Marx had an equally strong faith in natural laws, and his philosophy of social progress (the Materialist Conception of History) is based on the opinion that society evolves according to laws which no man can change. A modern Bolshevik who has written an entire book on *Historical Materialism*, Bukharin, writes: "Society and its evolution are as much subject to natural law as is everything else in the universe": and quite consistently with this opinion he maintains that the human will is not free. The line of this necessary evolution from the eighteenth century onwards is, according to Marx, from capitalism through socialism to complete communism, and the driving force behind the evolution is the class-struggle. Both in their materialistic outlook and in their faith in "economic laws" Marx and the classical economists are not so far apart as one might have expected from the fact that he is a socialist and that they are individualists. Nor do they differ very much in their attitude to the mass of the workers, in spite of the Marxist programme of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The ideal of the economists was really a well-disciplined hard-working body of people, at the orders of their capitalist employers, asking for no voice in the control of production and its conditions or in the government of the country. The ideal of Marxism is similarly a well-disciplined hard-working body of people, at the orders of the Politbureau, content to leave the administration of industry and politics to the leaders of the Comintern.

Let us now see how the principles of Marxism have affected social and economic practice. It was, in the first place, the revolutionary principles laid down by Marx and developed by Lenin which enabled the Bolsheviks to establish themselves on the ruins of nascent democracy in Russia, after the downfall of Tsardom. It is that effective application of principles to practice that has given them the power to continue to apply their principles to that unhappy country. It is unnecessary for me to detail their campaign against God and religion, but that campaign is a logical application of the principle that "reli-

gion is the opium of the people"; or to describe the pitiful condition of the outcast Russian children: a logical outcome of the Marxist hatred of the family. Applying the doctrine of the class-war, they have done their best to stamp out the middle class as well as the rich. Even the peasant with a tiny stock of two or three head of cattle has been persecuted. Class hatred has been fostered in other countries so far as Bolshevik funds permitted. The conscription of labour in the timber and grain industries has been unhesitatingly enforced by the Government, and quite recently (October, 1930) instructions have been issued to the labour exchanges "to take all necessary measures in order that the unemployed be immediately sent to work, and of these the first to be sent are persons entitled to draw unemployment benefit." Private trading, which Lenin permitted by his New Economic Policy, is once again being attacked under the more intransigent Stalin. Who can deny that the stern principles of Marx are being applied as thoroughly as possible? One might expect to see some signs, if Marx were right, that the welfare of the Russian people is advancing, that they are heartily co-operating with their communist saviours; but on the contrary one finds in official documents of the U.S.S.R. continual complaints against the workers, against those in charge of State enterprises, against State departments, and even against some of the leaders of the Communist Party in Russia.

On the last point, no more need be said than to recall how often we read that such-and-such a leader has fallen into some sort of economic heresy, that he has been expelled from the Party, that he has recanted, that he has relapsed, and so on. What the meaning of all these manoeuvres may be it is hard to say, but it is plain that even at the seat of government all are not a happy band of brothers. The People's Commissariat of Labour, we were told by the Russian Government last October, together with its local organizations, "has taken up a purely bureaucratic stand on economic questions," and "have been slack in their work, and individual directors have glossed over the existing defects of the organization." Official complaints are made that there has been a falling-off in the quality of goods produced by the State industries, and that this does great harm to the workers and peasants as consumers. Further complaints are made

against workers who are malingerers, to whom the careless Commissariat of Labour has paid out tens of millions of roubles. (See the Blue Book, "Russia No. 1 (1931)," Cmd. 3775.)

Now does not this show that the principles of Marxism are unsound? Destroy class-distinctions by destroying private property; to effect this set up, by revolution, a Dictatorship of the Proletariat; gradually the State will wither away as the necessity for its control ceases, on the supposition that all will labour to the best of their ability. Set the mind of man free from the bonds of belief in God and of hope of a hereafter; take away his opium from him, and he will come to new and vigorous life, centring his attention and his desires on this world and its satisfactions. Such, in summary, was the advice of Marx, based on his principles of atheism and materialism. And everything we can learn about Russia shows that under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat the mass of men remains at least as selfish and lazy as under capitalism; and that the position of the worker in Russia is at the very least no better than in countries which have refused to accept the Marxist creed. It is perhaps worth noticing that Centrosoyus (the Russian co-operative association) has lately been complaining that it is impossible to send by ordinary train certain goods of which there is a scarcity, because the entire consignment disappeared; it is quite usual for 70 per cent. of other goods to be missing. Evidently there are some in Russia who are under the impression that the second or perfect phase of communism has arrived, and who are already putting into practice the principle, "To each according to his needs."

We have considered, then, two opposed sets of principles, those of the individualist economists of last century and those of the revolutionary socialist Marx, and we have seen that they have had a powerful effect on practice, by no means to the advantage of the workers. I purposely refrain from discussing the effects of the partial applications of Marxism on the Continent after the War. Dr. Shadwell has done this in his *The Breakdown of Socialism*, and whether one agrees or disagrees with his own economic and political views, one must admit that the facts he enumerates make it clear that Marxism is unworkable.

Rather than enter upon a discussion which might easily

assume the aspect of party politics, I prefer to consider present principles and practice in Great Britain, in order to see what relation there is between them. Mr. Keynes, one of our most eminent economists, made a significant admission the other day in a lecture on the trade slump at the Royal Institution. Lately, he said, there had been a lull in the progress of economic theory, and it was now in the state when we were all confused. That certainly confirms the impression of the ordinary man who reads the conflicting statements of economists published in the newspapers. *Laissez-faire* is dethroned, and Mr. Keynes himself has sung its dirge in his book, *The End of Laissez-faire*. The trouble is that our economists do not know what to put in its place. When called in by society as expert advisers, they are of course confronted by a much more complicated case than that with which the classical economists had to deal. As a lesson in the dangers of accepting false principles, it is worth noticing how much of our social and economic difficulties to-day are legacies of the now discredited theories of the past. It is not easy to change a widely-held opinion, especially when that opinion is supported by experts; but it is far less easy to change the concrete conditions which have arisen out of the general adoption of that theory.

It has been made a matter of reproach to the employers in the cotton trade that they seem unable to come to any agreement among themselves which would lead to the rationalization of their industry, and it is certainly true that it has proved uncommonly difficult to persuade them to adopt a common industrial policy. The cotton employer, we are told, is essentially individualist. But in adopting this attitude he is simply following the precepts of the *laissez-faire* school. It is no mere coincidence that this school was called the Manchester school, and that Manchester is one of the great cotton centres.

The coal trade, too, has shown the same characteristic, and an Act of Parliament has proved necessary to secure some sort of co-ordination in it. Once again we see the *laissez-faire* mentality persisting. Indeed we hear it vehemently expressed in demands that the Government should leave the coal trade alone, a cry that is repeated by many other employers as though non-intervention by the State with industry was a first principle which no sensible man could question. I am not concerned to dis-

cuss whether the Government's intervention has always been wise, but only to point out that the protests against it are based on the assumption that "Hands off industry" is an obvious maxim of sound political science.

When Great Britain took the plunge last century and decided to turn herself into an industrialized country, the growth of factories was accompanied, as we have seen, by a growth of nightmare towns. Those towns are still, to a large extent, blots not only on the landscape but on the social conscience of the community. Had the public authorities from the first done their duty and supervised the construction of the new towns, we should not have now the anguishing problem of the slums to solve. But at the time economic principles tied their hands, and the present generation is still paying the penalty.

It is hardly too much to say that British agriculture was deliberately ruined by the economic theories of last century. The enclosures of land were perhaps necessary owing to the growth of population, but the supineness of the State in face of the abuses which accompanied enclosure is just what one would expect from politicians convinced that "natural laws" would secure that everything turned out for the best. What an extremely cautious and impartial historian (W. H. R. Curtler, *The Enclosure and Redistribution of our Land*) has called "the land hunger of the rich," co-operated with the dominant spirit of competition to destroy the British peasantry. "The sin of ignoring the moral claims of the poor on enclosure must, on the whole, be laid to their (the English landowners') charge," says Mr. Curtler, studiously moderate as ever. Not distribution of land but its concentration in the hands of large land-owners was the ideal of the day. The next step in giving free scope to the working of economic laws was, of course, to expose even the large landowners to the blast of competition with foreign imports of wheat, so that prices might fall and the farmer be made to pay by his ruin the wages of the factory hands. And thus it is that we find British agriculture in the slough of despond to-day.

The maxim, "Produce as much as ever you can," was common to economists from the days of the Physiocrats, and it was coupled with the firmly held opinion that general over-production was impossible. Underlying this

was the assumption that the product would always find a sale at the market price. For the English manufacturer of the nineteenth century that was an easy assumption to make, for he had many customers demanding his goods from foreign countries. The home market did not seem to him important so long as he could export his textiles, his coal, his machinery and ships. It appeared to him that the larger the wages he paid his workers the less his profit, and he resented the action of the trade unions in struggling for an improvement in the workers' standard of life. He was too short-sighted to realise—or perhaps too indifferent to the future of his country to care, if he had realised—that the time was rapidly coming when his foreign customers would supply themselves with the goods they needed, and that by keeping down the wages of his workers he was strangling a potential market. The enormous extent to which property in Great Britain is concentrated in a few hands at the present time is largely a result of the fact that a family living wage was denied to the British workers so far as they were not powerful enough to insist upon it. To-day that wealth is perforce being redistributed through the “social services” of insurance against sickness and unemployment, of old-age pensions and the Poor Law; a method necessary to save the poor from starvation but open to a vast number of abuses to which the healthy method of paying fair wages is not open.

Finally, as a last and most serious legacy of the bad old days of *laissez-faire* there is the all-pervading hostility and distrust between employers and employed. To account for this it is necessary to remember not merely the abuses of early capitalism but also the importance laid by the system of “natural liberty” on the motive of self-interest. Give that free play, and economic law, or the Hidden Hand of Providence, would secure that the greatest happiness of the greatest number would follow; such was the theory. But men are naturally distrustful of those who are openly seeking their own interest; and without any urging on the part of economists they will do all in their power to protect themselves against those they distrust. There is a psychological factor involved which the economists overlooked as completely as they overlooked the moral factor. A purely competitive atmosphere breeds necessarily distrust and suspicion, which

the opium of "economic necessity" does nothing to soothe. The seeds of the so-called general strike of 1926 were sown by the Physiocrats.

Laissez-faire began to be doubted from about the eighties of last century, and officially it is discredited to-day. But it lingers still in the minds of some who have not learned the lessons of the past, and we have the complacent individualist still with us. Nevertheless the logic of events has forced another policy on the country as a whole, a policy which on many points confirms the soundness of Catholic social doctrine in its unceasing protest against the system of "natural liberty." The danger to-day is that for want of any clear principles the pendulum may swing too far, that in reaction from the mistakes of the past we may fall into new errors.

The economic and political situation to-day is very different from that of the early nineteenth century. The need for a revival of British agriculture is widely recognized, and the Government of the moment is at present pressing forward two important Agricultural Bills, on the merits of which opinion is sharply divided. An equally urgent need is that of more and better housing for the workers, and the State has interfered with varying success in order to supply the need. Out of the earlier inefficient Factory Acts there has grown up a great system of governmental regulation of the conditions in mines and factories. The national scandal of sweating, which resulted necessarily from the policy of leaving "economic laws" to regulate wages, has been countered by the Trade Boards Acts. Attempts have been made to fix a minimum wage in agriculture, though any attempt to discuss the possibility of a living wage in industry as a whole is still attacked as a socialistic proposal. Competition between those who have money to lend and those who wish to borrow it has been curtailed by Moneylenders Acts; and the gross inequalities of fortune which the industrial and agricultural revolutions of last century produced are being attacked by various "social insurances." No longer are trade unions forbidden by law, as they used to be; and though the repeal of the Combination Acts may no doubt be attributed to the *laissez-faire* spirit, it is to be remembered that Francis Place himself, the protagonist of repeal, was no believer in trade unions. He thought that with the repeal of the Combination Acts they would die

out. What powers are to be conceded to trade unions is a question which has occupied the attention of Parliament, and will, it is to be feared, be eventually settled by considerations of party interests rather than of principle. But that trade unions have an important function to fulfil in the social system is generally admitted, and has been explicitly recognised by the National Health Insurance Acts, by the Whitley scheme for joint industrial councils, and by the conferences between representatives of employers' federations and of the Trades Union Congress, originated by the late Lord Melchett.

The extension of State action on the one hand, and the development of organisations of employers and employed on the other, are a proof that *laissez-faire* has proved unworkable, just as the Russian experiment has shown that Marxism is fundamentally false. Catholic social philosophy rejects both individualism and socialism, and our experience goes to show that it is based on true principles. It now remains to consider briefly what those principles are.

We may say that Catholic social principles are simply the principles of Christian morality applied to the relations between men when they deal with one another as fellow-citizens or as employer and employed. Consequently the most fundamental principles of all are those concerning the great spiritual truths and the moral virtues. The economists whom we have been criticising, like their Marxist opponents, defended a system which was in fact, whatever it may have professed to be, materialistic; no Catholic theory, of course, could be that. It is one thing to put forward material welfare as though it were the most important factor in human life, but it is another to assert that material welfare and its pursuit have their rightful place in the life of a Christian. That place, for the Catholic social philosopher, is in subordination to spiritual welfare; and this means that material welfare is to be sought after only in so far as it does not impede spiritual development. I have expressed it in this way not because I wish to suggest that the pursuit of material welfare is something to be merely tolerated in a Catholic, but because I wish to guard myself from seeming to say that material welfare may be sought only in so far as it advances spiritual development; for in this form

my statement would seem to impose on all men a duty of asceticism which Catholic theology reserves for those who have voluntarily chosen it. The virtue of temperance does not limit us to such bodily goods as will satisfy our essential needs; this is asceticism such as the Gospel counsels but does not command. It requires only that we do not seek them to such an extent as to injure our souls. Catholic social philosophy, then, does not ignore temporal welfare as something unworthy of a Christian; it treats it as good, though not the ultimate good, and it is this last clause which in this matter distinguishes our principles from those of materialists. "It must not be supposed that the entire attention of the Church is so fixed upon the spiritual progress of mankind that she neglects their temporal and earthly interests." (*Rerum Novarum*.) Thus we find Pope Leo XIII demanding that the worker should receive at least a wage sufficient to keep him and his family in decent conditions, and that he should not be overworked by his employer, and urging upon legislators the necessity for a wide distribution of ownership of property, especially of the land; and our present Holy Father Pope Pius XI, in his recent encyclicals, insists on the importance of social reconstruction and the abolition of "proletarianism" as conditions of a fully Christian life.

How is this temporal welfare to be secured? Not by abolishing the right of private property, as Marx desires; nor by leaving economic relations to the free play of competition, as the theory of *laissez-faire* would say; but by the combined action of the Church, the State, and associations of employers and trade unions. I cannot now discuss this action in detail. My point is that *the pressure of hard facts* has taught the world that if social reform is to come at all it must be along these lines.

Without offering any opinion as to whether State action in the past has always been wise, I have shown how it has proved absolutely necessary that State action should be taken. And I have shown how associations of employers and trade unions have gradually asserted their indispensability in our social economy. Even the joint industrial committees set up under the Whitley scheme or independently of it were recommended last century by Pope Leo, and have been again recommended in the last couple of years by the Sacred Congregation of the Council

(See *Trade Unions and Employers' Associations*: C.S.G. : 2d.): and now again in the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*.

But it may be urged that there are no signs that the assistance of the Church has been found necessary. To this I must reply that its necessity was never clearer than at present, and that the need is felt, though in the confused way which one would expect in a predominantly non-Catholic country. It is clearly recognised by all who have given thought to our social troubles that at their root is mutual distrust and suspicion between the classes, leading to class hostility. That hostility has been made a dogma by the Marxists, as we saw; it has been deplored as both unchristian and fatal to social progress by the Popes. To remedy this mutual distrust, we are told that there must be "a new spirit in industry." But what is that spirit to be? Obviously a spirit of unselfishness, of considering others and not merely oneself; even of self-sacrifice for the common good. Such a spirit as that can come from one source only, from the teaching and the grace of Our Lord. The classical economists canonised the spirit of self-seeking, and they laid the foundations of the Marxist doctrine of the class-war. On such a spirit and such a foundation no society can prosper, for a prosperous society is built up on willing co-operation; and that means unselfishness. No vague platitudes about the brotherhood of man or the beauty of self-sacrifice will change the hearts of men, only too prone to self-seeking. Nothing will do it but one hundred per cent. Christianity; and that means Catholicism; and that means the Church.

If, then, I have succeeded in proving that principles have an enormous effect on practice, I have also proved that without Catholic social principles there will be no sound social practice. It is surely our duty as Catholics and loyal citizens to study those principles and to endeavour to have them put into effect.

THE TREASON OF THE ENGLISH MARTYRS

BY THE REV. RICHARD L. SMITH, Ph.D., M.A.

IT is an old charge that the Catholics, especially the priests, who were put to death in England under the Penal Laws, were the enemies of their country and that, therefore, they were rightly executed with all the penalties of high treason. It is an old charge but as common to-day as ever it was, the only difference being that it has shifted its ground considerably and is now a subtle thing to answer. When we think of all that the Martyrs suffered—in exile, in their public life and passion—the accusation rouses us to indignant denial, and we should, indeed, disgrace our stock were our blood not to boil at the very thought. But heat is not argument and there is need of argument here. We are no longer concerned with the crude attacks that once disgraced our histories. They exist still, for whenever religious hate digs its own deep pit, there will always be crawling things to cover the floor. But to-day the real battle is not down in such slimy places; for long enough it has been up above in the open air, a battle of scholars with weapons plucked from the archives of Europe. This is not a challenge we can afford to neglect, nor, in most cases, one whose sincerity we ought to suspect. But for the proud memory of our Martyrs it is one we ought to meet, chivalrously always, still unflinchingly, the crusade of a Richard against a Saladin.

During the centuries this charge of treachery has been justified on varying grounds. There have been those who said simply that the Catholic Recusants flouted the laws of the Realm; such an argument would canonize the horrors of the anti-God Front in modern Russia. Then there are the historians who have seen in any supra-national religion a grave political danger to the freedom of this tight little island; but to argue so is to side with the nationalists among the Jews against our Lord, with the Roman Empire against the early Christians. Others, again, have pointed to the plots against Elizabeth in which Catholics were implicated from the

Pope downwards.¹ I shall have something to say about this later. For the present it is sufficient to counter with Rome's caution in beatifying anyone suspected of political intrigue. Not only has Father Garnet's case been postponed, owing to his connection with the Gunpowder Plot, but Haydock's unblemished record has been similarly treated. This seems inexplicable to me, but it does prove the strictness of the Congregation of Rites, and that, therefore, no question of plotting can complicate the issue in the case of the Martyrs officially recognised by Rome.

The challenge we have to meet is concerned with the *Beati*, men acknowledged to have been saintly and apostolic, with Mayne, Sherwin, Campion and Southwell, who wrote: "About Parliament I say nothing, as I desire my letter, like my soul, to have absolutely nothing to do with matters of state." The modern historians subsume in perfect form; these men, they say, devoted exclusively, as we will grant, to the care of souls, were nevertheless the enemies of their country, and so were rightly done to death as traitors. The case is well put by Meyer²:—"The method of procedure in trials for treasonable opinions soon took systematic shape. The following questions were put to the accused:

"1. Did he acknowledge Elizabeth as his lawful Queen? Did he acknowledge her supremacy in all causes as well spiritual as temporal?

"2. Did he believe the Pope could excommunicate and depose the Queen?

"After 1580 a third inquiry was often added to these, or replaced the second—an inquiry never omitted after the Armada.

¹ I may remark that there is room for much historical research over Gregory XIII's approval of Ely and Parry. Pastor's defence is quite unsatisfactory, whereas on the other hand Meyer cannot be said to have proved his case conclusively. The difficulty is to know exactly what the Pope approved. As Father Pollen said in *The Month* (1902), "the actual words always come to us from that Secretary (Como), not from the Pope, who might conceivably have expressed himself differently."

² These extracts are taken from Meyer: *England and the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*, pp. 157, *et seqq.* I have taken most of my facts from Meyer, a first-rate scholar and a non-Catholic.

" 3. In the event of a Catholic Invasion, which side would the accused take, the Queen's or the Pope's?

" . . . The first two interrogations were more legal and theoretical than political, and were more concerned with theory than practice. . . . The case was different with the third question, which followed simply from the other questions as a conclusion from premises, and as such resolved itself into a religious question affecting the conscience. But since it was no longer a mere theory that was in question, but its application to practical politics, there was no denying that the third question could be justified on political grounds. No inquiry could be better chosen to prove to the public mind that priests were dangerous to the State and bring about their condemnation as conspirators. . . .

" The answers reveal two things. First: the traditional view which represents the Jesuits and other priests who worked in England as being essentially untruthful, and underhand, and hypocrites, is false—the truth being that they were men who said what they thought in spite of the gallows and the knife . . . Secondly: the replies to ' the bloody question ' show that the English Government was driven by the instinct of self-preservation to inquire into the opinions which men held, and to adopt the methods of the Inquisition. When a man frankly admits at a moment when war is imminent that he would side with his country's foes, he cannot expect mercy. And the greater the influence he commands, or is supposed to command, the less chance there is of his getting off. Now in matters of conscience no authority was more highly valued by English Catholics than that of their priests. The very questions which the judges put to the accused were also put to spiritual fathers by their spiritual children. . . . A priest who never uttered a word on politics, or spoke against the heretical Queen, might yet be called upon in the discharge of his priestly duties to direct consciences in regard to the chief political question of the hour—to *seduce* them, speaking from the standpoint of the English Government. . . . In the face of facts such as these it is impossible to speak of persecution from religious motives. . . . Whenever the judges condemned priests as conspirators and assassins, the verdicts, with a few exceptions, amounted to judicial murder. But

when the labours of the priests, even of those who wished to keep clear altogether of politics, were held to be a danger to the State, the sentences were a political necessity as a measure of self-defence."

I know of no stronger statement of the case. Full justice is paid to the disinterestedness, to the truth and courage of the Missionary Priests, who, looking up at Topcliffe from their bed upon the rack, refused to name their protectors or their fellow-workers. I have had to abbreviate Meyer's tribute ruthlessly for the sake of space. But when all is said, the situation did seem to demand drastic measures. The Pope had instigated, or at least supported, the Irish Rebellion of 1579. The great Armada sailed with his blessing, and Cardinal Allen did his best to persuade his Catholic countrymen to desert the Queen in her hour of peril. "Feight not, for God's loue, feight not in that quarrel, in which if you die you are sure to be dammed. . . . Forsake her therefore betime, that you be no inwrapped in her sinnes, punishment and damnation."³ Nor was all danger over after the victory off Gravelines. One is apt to forget that this was not the last Armada to sail from Spain against the English heretics. And yet in the year after the defeat of the first, a young priest boldly declared before the judge "that if an army be sent into the realm, he will take part with that army and will persuade as many Catholics as he can to do the like."⁴ Meyer does not concern himself with specious general principles that may land him in an impossible position. He is content to paint the picture of England's need, and so justifies the bloody question to discover the hidden enemies within her borders. As he says himself so powerfully, "when a man frankly admits at a moment when war is imminent that he would side with his country's foes, he cannot expect mercy." What position could seem more reasonable?

Yet despite Meyer's determination to limit the charge to this one very practical count, it cannot in fact be so limited; and there are principles involved which must

³ Quoted by Meyer, p. 327.

⁴ Quoted by Meyer, p. 162, from Pollen: *Unpublished Documents Relating to the English Martyrs*. I. (1908), pp. 171, et seqq.

be examined before one can arrive at an adequate view of the whole problem. So, first, what is treason?

It was defined in a famous statute of 1352 which has formed the basis of our law on the subject to the present day. From this we may summarise three main modes of treason, which are, in Maitland's words: "1. Imagining the king's death, *i.e.*, forming an intention to kill the king and displaying this intention by some overt act: 2. Levying war against the king: 3. Adhering to the king's enemies."⁵ In the development of Tudor autocracy, treason had come to include opinions, which had never ripened into any overt act. It is only fair to remember that Elizabeth did not invent this extension, though it proved so useful to her government and provided Walsingham and Topcliffe with the excuse for their foul trades of spying and of torture. But this extension to mere opinions was still so recent as to arouse resentment. Campion protested that his answers to hypothetical questions were no part of his indictment, "not to be given in evidence and unfit to be discussed at the King's bench. To conclude, they are not matters of fact: they be not in the trial of the country: the jury ought not to take any notice of them."⁶ This resentment was not confined to the prisoners at the bar, but was evidently shared even on the bench. In Peacham's Case, 1615, where treasonable matter had been found in a written sermon, the law authorities were very doubtful whether a charge of treason could stand since the sermon had neither been printed nor published; so that they disagreed whether it constituted an overt act.⁷ And though Burleigh wrote a tract to defend the Government's methods, which was his weakest piece of propaganda and did credit neither to his powers of persuasion nor to his good faith, most men will agree with Hallam's verdict "that any matter of opinion not proved to have ripened into an overt act, and extorted only, or rather conjectured, through a compulsive inquiry, could sustain in law or justice a conviction for high treason,

⁵ Maitland: *The Constitutional History of England*. (1919). p. 227.

⁶ Simpson, *Edmund Campion*, p. 419.

⁷ Tanner: *Constitutional Conflicts in the XVII Century*. p. 38.

is what the author of this pamphlet has not rendered manifest."⁸

There is a second point to notice of even greater importance, though it seems sufficiently obvious. The historical basis of the idea of treason in Christian times lay in the divine origin of lawful authority. King Alfred, for instance, says no mercy can be shown to this crime, since God Almighty showed none to those who despised Him, and Christ, God's Son, adjudged none to those who sold Him, and commanded that a lord should be loved as one's self. There is no necessary connection between this and the Divine Right of Kings: it did not imply that every royal command had divine sanction, as poor James I persuaded himself—indeed, he seemed to think that he was in partnership with the Holy Ghost—but it did mean that armed resistance to lawful authority was a defiance of the authority of God. Now, however this idea may have altered in the course of legal development, the lawfulness of the authority resisted remains of its essence. No unlawful ruler is the head or representative of the State, and therefore resistance to him is no crime against the State, however bad policy it may be.⁹ The distinction is exemplified in our English law by a statute of Henry VII, passed in 1495, wherein it is provided that obedience to a king *de facto* who is not also king *de iure* shall not after a restoration expose its adherents to the penalties of treason. Obedience to a usurper is treason to the *lawful* king, although he has not yet secured his crown, just because he is the lawful king: but in this particular case the legal crime shall not be visited with its usual punishment. This principle, that treason concerns resistance only to lawful authority, is immensely important for the case we are to argue.

Does this mean that a lawfully constituted authority can never be resisted? Such a contention would leave no redress against obstinate tyranny, and was certainly not the current opinion in the days of Elizabeth. Among Catholics, St. Thomas had written: "*Regimen tyrannicum non est iustum, quia non ordinatur ad bonum com-*

⁸ Hallam: *Constitutional History of England*. (Everyman.) I., p. 143.

⁹ Of course, a usurper may become king *de iure*, but all that here concerns us is the distinction between the two titles.

mune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis. . . . Et ideo perturbatio huius regiminis non habet rationem seditionis."¹⁰ Suarez said the same in answer to James I: "Ideoque si rex legitimus tyrannice gubernet, et regno nullum aliud subsit remedium ad se defendendum, nisi regem expellere ac deponere, poterit respublica tota, publico et communi consilio civitatum et procerum, regem deponere. . . ."¹¹ See also Bañez, *De Iustitia et Iure*, q. 64, a. 3. It was, in fact, an old view, dating back to the "remota iustitia, quid regna nisi magna latrocinia?" of the *De Civitate Dei*.

Protestant Divines of the day concurred so heartily as to omit most of the safeguards demanded by St. Thomas and Suarez. Cardinal Allen in his *True, Sincere and Modest Defence of English Catholics* makes an effective list of quotations from the writings of the leading Reformers. For instance, from Calvin he culls this unequivocal decision: "Abdicant se potestate, terreni principes, dum insurgunt contra Deum: immo indigni sunt qui censeantur in hominum numero. Potius ergo conspuere in illorum capita, quam illis parere. . . ." Zwingli, "a cater cosen to the Calvinists in religion," declared it a crime *not to rebel* in such circumstances: "If the Empire of Rome, or what other sovereign soever, should oppress the sincere religion, and we negligently suffer the same, we shall be charged with contempt no less than the oppressors thereof themselves. Wherefore we have an example in the fifteenth of Jeremiah, where the destruction of the people is prophesied, for that they suffered their King Manasses, being impious and ungodly, to be unpunished." Or categorically again: "When kings rule unfaithfully and otherwise than the rule of the Gospel prescribeth, they may, with God be deposed." These are only samples of the rash statements of which the English Cardinal takes toll; and to his collection of Beza, Luther, the Duke of Saxony and the Landgrave, he might have added Melancthon and others. But perhaps it will be more interesting to reproduce what he found among the Reformers of our own Island. Goodman applauded Wyatt's rebellion against Mary Tudor to

¹⁰ *Summa Theologica*: Secunda Secundae, q. xlii, art. 2, ad tertium.

¹¹ *Defensio Fidei Catholicae, etc.*, lib. VI, c. 4, par. 15.

the extent of fastening treason not only on the loyalists but upon all who sat on the fence: Zwingli would have clapped his verdict, that as Wyatt's "cause was just . . . they all were traitors that took not part with him." In Scotland the fire-eating Knox had long despaired of authority as wielded by the Monstrous Regiment of Women: "If the people have either rashly promoted any manifest wicked person, or else ignorantly chosen such a one as after declareth himself unworthy of regiment above the people of God (and such be all idolaters and cruel persecutors) most justly may the same men depose and punish him." There can be no doubt that the Protestant Divines of the times went all the way with the Catholics and vastly further. It makes no difference that they did not all agree on the identity of Goodman's "Gospel" or Zwingli's "sincere religion." Their position is clear beyond cavil; the people may rebel against and depose any prince who does not rule according to the law of God; such a one is no longer their lawful authority—*abdicant se potestate*—and therefore it follows that there can be no question of treason. This is to put legally what they prefer to express in the fiercest imagery of the Old Testament.

So much for theory, whether legal or ethical. It is high time for the application to our particular problem.

To the Catholics Elizabeth was both ungodly and impious; in fact, most modern writers would endorse the description. It is true that she was fond of composing prayers to be recited by her under-paid, under-fed, under-armed sailors; and for that exhibition of religious feeling the probable causes are pride in her own literary compositions and their cheapness as a substitute for arrears of pay. The Queen was also a cruel persecutor, though thereby I do not accuse her of personal cruelty. So she satisfied all the tests proposed by the Protestants, and they ought not to have affected horror if there had been a general insurrection of the Catholics. In view of their opinion of the old Religion, it is understandable that they should have called such a rebellion blind, obstinate, impious, superstitious, priest-ridden, almost what you will. Almost—for there was one epithet they could not logically use, and that was disloyal. Even if the Catholics were wrong, and so technically became traitors, they

could not—on the Protestants' own principles—be accused of wishing their country ill in trying to subdue a ruler who appeared to them as a persecutor of the sincere religion, nor of any but technical treachery, since—again on Protestant principles—that ruler could no longer be their lawful authority. Yet treachery was hurled against them in its fullest implication: when, indeed, has venomous hatred ever courted logic?

This is no mere dialectical point. Elizabeth's whole foreign policy, in so far as it could claim an ethical justification at all, supported the view that rebellion for conscience' sake was not treason. Despite the Queen's reverence for an anointed Sovereign, she supported Protestant rebels in Scotland, in the Low Countries and in France. She could not have it both ways, with one principle for export and its contradictory for domestic consumption. As Allen words it in the rolling English of his century: "The Protestants of Flanders held it for a most certain truth (by the approbation also and solicitation of England), that they might rebel against their supreme magistrate for religion, when by force of arms they altered all, and deposed their sovereign. Which ought the more to weigh with the English Calvinists for that (as I have signified) their pudding lay also in that fire. As likewise it is well known that they themselves have been the chief procurers and doers in the depriving of the lawful and anointed Queen of Scotland, and for her further affliction have kept her also in captivity these fourteen years together. And here in these cases of their own no treasonable propositions, no resisting of 'God's anointed' . . . can have place or bear sway. . . . And therefore there is no treason in this case, if we follow the present divinity of England; nor new example, if we respect the furious attempts and rebellions of Scotland, Flanders, France and Germany, against their superiors, for maintenance of their heresies, and all well allowed by the ministry of every province." When Spain wanted leave to buy English guns, Elizabeth drove a typically one-sided bargain. The English refugees in the Netherlands were to be expelled, and while the Queen promised to do the same by all Spanish rebels residing in England, she expressly excepted all "who for the sake of religion and the gospel had left their home and flown to this

peaceful land as to a refuge."¹² In foreign policy the Government's practice marched hand in hand with Protestant theory; only the Catholics at home were debarred from taking up the same position. And the reason is not far to seek, since had they resorted to such a weapon, it would have been against Elizabeth herself.

On the principles of their opponents, then, Catholics would have been justified in any armed insurrection against the Queen. And, of course, in their own eyes the excommunication and deposition of the Bull, *Regnans in Excelsis*, would further have absolved them from the charge of sedition. I do not want to stress this Bull, since it is not necessary to the argument. But it ought to be pointed out that, whether the Pope possessed the deposing power or not, all Christendom had accepted his claim for centuries. At the Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215 and attended by English bishops, it was decreed that if any Lord temporal neglect to "purge his state from heretical filth" and after due admonition "contemn to come to order within one year's space, let relation be made to the supreme Bishop, that from thenceforth he may declare all his subjects to be discharged of their fealty towards him, and give up his land to be possessed by Catholics. . . ."¹³ No one, at the time, considered as traitors those members of John's baronage who were ready to join Philip of France against the English King, once Innocent III should have issued a decree of deposition. So, Elizabeth and her nationalist advisers were the innovators and the whole *onus probandi* fell upon them. A Catholic, if he defended the deposing power, was only defending what had hitherto been the Law of Nations. The English conception of treason had existed for centuries without anyone's having discovered any incompatibility between the two; and that there was, in fact, such incompatibility rested on the word of the Queen and her ministers, with obvious politi-

¹² Meyer : *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

¹³ Allen : *Op. cit.*, p. 109. So the Cardinal translates from the third chapter of the Council : " Si vero dominus temporalis requisitus et monitus ab ecclesia, terram suam purgare neglexerit ab hac haeretica foeditate. . . . Et, si satisfacere contemserit infra annum, significetur hoc summo pontifici : ut extunc ipse vassallos ab eius fidelitate denunciaret absolutos, & terram exponat catholicis occupandam. . . ." Mansi. XXII, p. 987.

cal ends to bias their judgment.¹⁴ The logically minded might be excused for murmuring *nemo sibi iudex*.

I am quite aware that none of this answers the case as presented by Meyer. But it has been necessary to touch on these underlying ideas to show how unfounded is any accusation of subjective disloyalty against even the more politically minded Catholics, if only one will set them against the background of their own century and not judge them by the light of after-events and later legal axioms.

For Meyer the justification of Tyburn is not that the Missionary priests were traitors in any subjective sense, but that they were a political danger in the circumstances in which England then found herself. And this, indeed, is what most people mean when they think of the Martyrs as traitors. They do not so stigmatize Fisher and More, nor the victims of the Popish Plot, since it is now admitted that there was no real plot and therefore no real crisis. But under Elizabeth there were real plots, real rebellions and a real invasion. So that the Missionaries, coming from abroad where they had been trained, and acknowledging as their supreme authority the politically hostile Bishop of Rome, were of necessity a public peril, however patriotic their sentiments.

One must not white-wash the Missionary Priests indiscriminately. Ballard, Tyrrell and Gifford were all in orders. But that they were typical of their brethren is a fantastic calumny, if only because none was of the stuff of which martyrs are made. Ballard never exercised his ministry, and lived a life of luxury; Tyrrell, who changed his obedience with the impartiality of a chameleon, was a spy in Burleigh's service; and Gifford followed the same amiable profession while still a student at the Venerabile. We are dealing now with the non-politically minded priests, who formed the great majority; and for the share they took in the plots of the reign the Spanish Ambassador, Mendoza, gives a naïve testimonial: "They, although ardently zealous as regards religion, cannot be trusted with matters of state unless they are taught word for word what they have to say."¹⁵ The laity, too, seem

¹⁴ This is not to deny that conditions had changed from the days of Pope Innocent, but to protest against supposing that people of Tudor days could see the difference as clearly as we can.

¹⁵ Meyer: p. 295.

to have disappointed the Spaniards. Guerau de Spes wrote to Philip of the Catholic Lords' Rising in 1569: "I have some confidence that they will serve your Majesty well at this juncture, although the fact that they are Englishmen and not entirely Catholic makes one always suspicious of them."¹⁶ They were English as well as Catholic, and I suppose he meant that they had not transferred their allegiance from the tomb of St. Peter to the tomb of the Escorial. As plotters it is certain that the English Catholics were a poor body. Individuals enjoyed the game, but the overwhelming majority loathed it and could not be counted a political danger on that score. Indeed, one is tempted to doubt whether the professionals were as good at it as they flattered themselves, for Elizabeth's life never once seems to have been in serious danger.

Then, there is insurrection. The main occasion when Rome was concerned was in the Irish Rebellion. What the Missionaries thought about this Roman policy is revealed by the unexpected witness of Parsons: "We were heartily sorry . . . because we plainly foresaw that this would be laid against us and other priests, in that we should be taken in England as though we had been privy or partakers thereof, as in very truth we were not, nor ever heard or suspected the same until this day."¹⁷ If the Missionaries were distressed by the news, the Government hardly seem to have been frightened by it. A Council of Ministers at Greenwich on October 6th, 1579, summarised the situation briefly as: "The Pope malicious, but nowe a poor chapline, etc. Countries gone from him, etc."¹⁸—which, if uncomplimentary to his Holiness, shows that there was no such panic over the peril of the country as to frighten them even into temporary politeness. The earlier rising of the Northern Earls was not an exclusively Catholic affair, and in the event only decided the majority to stand loyally by the Crown.

This is seen, most strikingly, in the story of the one invasion, the Armada. When the galleons came rolling up the Channel and Parma stood ready with his forces

¹⁶ Meyer: p. 246.

¹⁷ Simpson: *Op cit.*, p. 146.

¹⁸ Meyer: p. 264.

in the Netherlands, there was no doubt on which side the English Catholics had ranged themselves. They were devoted to the Papacy and to the Mass, they would resist the Protestantising of their country; but they had no desire to hand England's fields over to the Spaniard nor to see the gloomy foreign autocrat replace their own more picturesque tyrant. Here is the answer to Meyer and to all who think with him. England was in peril, but not from the Missionary Priests nor from her Catholic population. Had the priests used the confessional to inculcate the supporting of a Catholic invasion, and had they possessed the influence which Meyer supposes, the sight of those lumbering ships in home waters would infallibly have been the signal for a rising in the rear of the anxious watchers at Tilbury. But such Catholics as took to arms at all were to be found within the ranks that cheered Gloriana as she rode among them, or manning the little craft that swept out to worry the mountainous galleons of Spain. Philip said his rosary when he was exasperated, while Elizabeth swore; but she was their Queen; and we read that not once but many times she heard a loud *Vivat Regina* from the lips of some hunted priest, standing in the crowd and watching her ride past, the central figure of her proud cavalcade.

This and not the bloody question is the cogent evidence. Facts are against Meyer. And even the affirmative answers to this famous question prove nothing as to the direction in which the priests urged their spiritual children. For when a question is disputed on good authority—as was this particular question of supporting a foreign invasion in aid of the true Faith—although a priest may hold one view, he will refrain from imposing any definite course of action upon his penitents. So, answers to hypothetical inquiries of this kind are only personal expressions of opinion, and without some further declaration prove nothing as regards the direction which was given in the confessional.

Moreover, Meyer leads one to suppose that whenever these questions were put to a prisoner and he was condemned for his answers, the condemnation was a political necessity, that the prisoner was, in other words, a danger to the State and executed only as such. The story of John Ogilvie suggests, on the contrary, that a priest might be condemned for his unsatisfactory

answers to these politico-theological questions, and yet that the motive of the verdict might be overwhelmingly religious. James I, at the moment fearing an excommunication, himself sent five inquiries to be put to Ogilvie. The result was a clear declaration that the Pope was the spiritual superior of the King and could excommunicate him: as to the deposing power and kindred questions he begged to be excused from an answer until the Church should decide what the doctors now disputed. At his condemnation, it was specially stated that he was not to suffer for saying Mass or for exercising his ministry, but for having refused his due obedience to his sovereign, especially in refusing to give an answer to these controverted points. On his way to the gallows a minister bade him save his life. Ogilvie, who had shown a quick tongue throughout his many examinations, promptly retorted: "As if my life hung on my own free will! I am accounted guilty of high treason, and for that am condemned." The minister laughed. "Stuff and nonsense as to this crime of yours. Give up the Pope and Papistry, and you shall be forgiven that crime and rewarded with gifts." The Martyr protested that he had chosen an unseemly moment for jesting, but the other replied: "I speak seriously and with certain authority. My Lord Archbishop gave commission to me to promise you his daughter in marriage and the richest prebend of the diocese as her dowry, provided I found you willing to step over from your religion to ours." Ogilvie saw his chance and made the minister repeat this offer to the crowd from the scaffold. Then he asked: "There is no fear that I should be held hereafter as guilty of high treason?" All the people cried out together: "By no means!" The Jesuit insisted: "I stand here therefore a criminal on the head of religion alone?" and they answered "On that alone!" "Very well," triumphantly concluded the Martyr, "that is plenty. On the head of religion alone I am condemned."

Governmental bad faith is shown in other ways. Charges of conspiracy were made whose falsity the authorities knew, but as they alone possessed the evidence, it was safe for the judges to ignore it and pass sentence. James Fenn put in an *alibi*. "I am condemned for that I with Mr. Haddock at Rome did con-

spire and at which time Mr. Haddock was a student at Rome and I a prisoner in the Marshalsea, or at the least I am sure that I was in England, but to my remembrance I was a prisoner in the Marshalsea.¹⁹ The official list of Catholic prisoners was accessible to the judges and it proved the impossibility of the accusation; yet sentence was passed as if the conspiracy had been established. Such another case is that of Thomas Ford in 1582, and Meyer owns that they were not rare. Why did the Government make such charges and reduce the practice of false witness to a system unless they felt the weakness of their case against the Seminary priests? They enlarged the definition of treason to ridiculous limits, yet they indicted Campion under the old Act of 1352. Why again, except that they were well aware one cannot define crimes at will? The process is easily reduced to an absurdity, and Burleigh had in fact so reduced it. Henry Walpole protested that if it were not treason to be ordained, it could not be treason to come into the country after ordination. The Government said it was, but the *ipse dixit* of a government could not make it treason; they could only threaten that such an action would be treated as treason, and with what justice let the reader decide.

Quite apart from the bad faith of the Government, the vast majority of answers show that the Martyrs were loyal to the Queen in all that was not sin; and that this is a restriction at all no sincere man will affirm. If the Queen bade one of her subjects deny his God, he was no traitor for refusing. Hunted, betrayed, tortured and condemned to a barbarous death, one after another they protested their loyalty to the Crown, even with their dying breath. Haydock said of Elizabeth "that he acknowledged her for his Queen and wished her all happiness and had offered up several prayers to God for her that very day; and that such was his disposition with regard to her Majesty, that if he were alone with her in a wilderness, where he might, without any danger, do to her what he pleased, he would not hurt her with the prick of a pin, though he might have the whole world for so doing."²⁰ William Hart "professed a ready obedience

¹⁹ Meyer: p. 152.

²⁰ These quotations are all from Challoner.

to her in all things that were not inconsistent with the Catholic religion." Luke Kirby was quite explicit: "If the Pope levy war against her or curse her unjustly, God preserve her from him also. . . . I acknowledge to my Queen as much duty and authority as ever I did to Queen Mary, or as any subject in France, Spain or Italy doth acknowledge to his King or Prince." Edmund Genings gave this mildly firm reply: "I know not in what I have offended my dear anointed Princess; for if I had offended her, or any other, in any thing, I would willingly ask her and all the world forgiveness. If she be offended with me without a cause, for professing my faith and religion, because I am a priest or because I will not turn minister against my conscience, I shall be, I trust, excused and innocent before God."

These testimonies might easily be multiplied, but lest I should seem to burke the difficult cases, let us examine the answers of Polydore Plasden.²¹ I cannot admit that his answers were typical of the majority, but they demonstrate the impossibility of avoiding technical treason when it was defined however the Government chose to define it, and when Church and State were both national conceptions, so that a crime against one became a crime against the other. Sir Walter Raleigh asked the prisoner: "Wouldst thou defend her (Elizabeth) against all her foreign and domestical enemies, if so thou wert able?" "I would," said Plasden, "to the uttermost of my power, and so I would counsel all men who would be persuaded by me." Then Topcliffe interposed. "If the King of Spain or the Pope would come into this country by force for no other end precisely, but by his canonical law, to establish that faith which thou believest and which thou thinkest to be the true Catholic faith as you call it, tell me, wouldst thou resist them?" Here was no question of handing England over to the foreigner, but only of invoking outside help to prevent the almighty powers of Tudor administration from being used to draw the Realm into schism and heresy. Still the Martyr was cautious in his reply: "I would counsel all men to maintain the right of their Prince." Topcliffe was not to be balked of his victim: "Dost thou think that the Queen hath any right to maintain this religion, and to forbid yours?" "No," said the priest. "Then thou thinkest

²¹ *Acts of English Martyrs*: Pollen, p. 112.

not to defend the Queen against the Pope, if he would come to establish thy religion?" And the fatal answer came at last: "I would never fight nor counsel others to fight against my religion." Even then Plasden speaks in the negative, and surely the only interpretation is this: Elizabeth is the rightful Queen of England, but her laws against Catholicism are unjust. I could do nothing to buttress those, but on every other head she shall find me the most loyal and obedient of her subjects. The fault really lay with the Government that had made the Penal laws a matter of treason; the men who resisted them, and resisted them *only passively*, felt that this argued no disloyalty to the country they loved, in which they worked at peril of their lives, and for whose highest interests they mounted the scaffold.

The case for the Martyrs is, therefore, this. On the principles of their enemies, they would have been justified in open rebellion; but they did not rebel, nor plot nor preach against the Queen's lawful authority. For opinions, to which they gave no public utterance, they were tortured and killed. With their last breath they boasted of their loyalty and protested that the laws against religion ought not to be made the test of their love of Queen and country. Is modern, enlightened opinion to reject the justice of their plea? In face of the facts of the Armada, is it still to be held that for the sake of religion the Martyrs would prefer Spain to England? They never so preferred a foreign country to their own. The most that can be said is that they would not have resisted Philip had he come purely as a restorer of Catholicism. But once governmental pressure had been removed, the campaign of calumny stopped, and the country left free to choose without fear or favour, they would have been the first to wave Philip off on his way back to Spain. As a matter of common sense, it is evident that such a pure-motived crusade as Topcliffe proposed to Plasden was an almost impossible contingency in the sixteenth century. Kings, in that Renaissance atmosphere, only became the swords of religion for gain which should materialize in this world as well as in the next. So, Topcliffe's problem was unreal, and being unreal it proved neither disloyalty nor political peril. The Martyrs who refused to answer such hypothetical cases until they arose in fact were, far from

quibbling, the only realists on either side. On this level, Parsons and Topcliffe keep company; but there was a dreadful difference in the results of their similar dreamings.

Is it not possible to present Topcliffe with an even more "treasonable" case? He spoke of an invasion solely for religious aims; but would political ambition in an invasion invariably free a Catholic from assisting its religious programme? Speaking now purely theoretically and for myself alone, it seems to me that if a Catholic of those times were convinced that political subjugation by a foreign Power were the only means of securing his country's Faith, and if he were also convinced that a particular, present invasion was morally certain, first, to triumph militarily, and then, secondly, to bring about a permanent, convinced establishment of Catholicism in the country, then, I think he would be bound, at least in charity to his compatriots, to support the invaders. I do not know whether such an opinion will find general acceptance among English Catholics to-day. But it is an enormous barrage of conditions, almost impossible to find in conjunction at any time. The very necessity of armed invasion by foreigners would make it doubly difficult to effect a conversion of heart that should outlast the pressure of military occupation. Certainly, during the reign of Elizabeth no such invasion was ever approached or remotely approached. So that if this possibility lay at the back of the minds of the interrogators of the Martyrs, or if it explains the continued suspicion of their loyalty which marks the work of historians, I answer that it is a grossly unhistorical reason. In making the case water-tight so that a contemporary Catholic could not get out of it, we have only succeeded in inventing a case which is not even within hailing distance of reality; and which therefore cannot justify in the realist pages of history a verdict of treason against the Martyrs or of their being a political peril to the country. The one invasion which came in sight of our shores was as much concerned with defending Spanish trade as with whipping English heresy; despite the stir it made at the time, English seamen knew its weak points, and the army drawn up to defend London was larger than the force at Parma's disposal; so that when the Armada came, it found the Catholics standing shoulder to

shoulder with their countrymen in defence of the land about which they grew lyrical, whether they trod its roads or dreamed of it in exile.

Campion's famous outburst at his trial sums up all I have tried to say. "*If our religion do make us traitors, we are worthy to be condemned; but otherwise are and have been as true subjects as ever the Queen had. In condemning us, you condemn all your ancestors . . . all the ancient priests, bishops and kings—all that was once the glory of England, the Island of Saints, and the most devoted child of the See of Peter. For what have we taught, however you may qualify it with the odious name of treason, that they did not uniformly teach? To be condemned with these old lights—not of England only, but of the world—by their degenerate descendants, is both glory and gladness to us. God lives; posterity will live; their judgment is not so liable to corruption as that of those who are now about to condemn us to death.*"²²

Yet Campion is still waiting for justice to be done to him and to his fellow-martyrs, than whom England never had sons that loved her more.

²² Simpson : *Op. cit.*, p. 435.

"MEN OF LITTLE SHOWING"

(2) PROVOST NORTHCOTE.

Rector of Oscott, 1860 to 1877.

BY THE VERY REV. ARTHUR CANON VILLIERS.

TO-DAY few remain of the priests and laymen who in the period enclosed by the years 1860 to 1877 came under the influence of the then Dr. James Spencer Northcote, when Oscott was the leading centre of Catholic education in this country. But this remnant will not readily consent that his name and work should find no place in this series of "Men of Little Showing." For if Oscott is mentioned at all—and Dr. Miller has already obtained for it pride of place by his loving tribute to Mgr. Parkinson—the memory of Northcote must be honoured, because that College owes to him more than to any other, either before or since his time, the high position which it holds in the educational history of Catholic England. Though he was not connected with the College for so outstandingly long a reign as that during which Dr. Parkinson and before him Dr. Weedall guided its destinies, still the greater part of the active years of his priestly life were spent as President of Oscott. Indeed, had not his health broken down irreparably after the seventeen years of incessant and successful labour during which he built up the decaying fortunes of the school, placing it in the first rank of Catholic colleges and on a par with the non-Catholic public schools of the country, he would doubtless have continued to devote to its further development his brilliant scholarship and his administrative abilities.

All the Midland priests for generations, with the few exceptions of those educated in Catholic Colleges and Universities abroad, were moulded by him and bore the unmistakeable impress of his spirit and character, so much so that there grew up a body of clerics recognised and catalogued as the Oscott pattern, men of gentlemanly bearing, cultured minds, robust piety and devoted to mission work.

Dr. Northcote was appointed President of Oscott in 1860 at a crisis in its history. Born of the penetrating

genius of Milner and Wiseman, nurtured in its youth by the piety but limited scholarship of men like Mgr. Weedall, Logan and Moore, it had failed to move *pari passu* with the educational progress of the times. Its scholastic system became antiquated, its staff inadequate in number and ability and its numbers gradually diminished. The laity were complaining of the defects of their own education and of that of the clergy. In the words, somewhat intemperate but as we now know in the main true, of the *Rambler* of that day, "the young Catholic laity both of the nobility, gentry and commercial classes, go forth into the world worse educated than any corresponding class in any one of the countless sects of Protestantism and the clergy receive the bare elements of an education, both secular and theological." Dr. Ullathorne, though he resented strongly the tone of this impeachment, felt in his heart of hearts that it voiced a real grievance, and he cast about to find a remedy at least as far as Oscott was concerned. Disregarding his own strong language against the authors of this indictment, as over-zealous converts, he fixed on Northcote, a leading convert, one who had himself for some years edited the censured *Rambler*, a comparatively young man and only four or five years a priest. It was a bold step under the circumstances, and met with much opposition on the part of older Catholics, both clerical and lay. But Ullathorne was a judge of men, and he had appraised Northcote as being the man, the only man capable of the work. So in the year 1860 Northcote, who had already been removed from Stoke-on-Trent to be Vice-President of Oscott, was at once, on the sudden death of Dr. Morgan, appointed President of the College. An Oxford man, a well-known classical scholar, "saturated," as it has been well said, "with the Christian spirit of ancient Rome," deeply read in the theology of the Fathers and with some years' knowledge of mission work, he proved, as the sequel showed, to be an ideal choice.

It was no light burden that Ullathorne had placed on Northcote's shoulders when he entrusted to him the apparently overwhelming task of lifting Oscott from the scholastic mediocrity into which it had fallen up to the high standard which marked the status of the non-Catholic public schools. It was evident that Oscott, from her very position as the chief Catholic educational

institution could not remain inferior any longer and moreover the legitimate demands of prominent Catholic laymen were incessantly clamorous. But Northcote faced the task bravely, and gave to it the last inch of his physical strength, his mental gifts, his scholarship and his administrative abilities.

Slowly but surely under his guidance the whole educational system of the College was changed. Formerly the clerical students had divided their time between study and the teaching of the lower forms, a system beneficial neither to teachers nor taught; the education was of a slipshod character, nor was it tested efficiently. Northcote changed all this. He increased the teaching staff by the addition of the best men he could find, and so gathered round him a staff styled with somewhat of exaggerated eulogy by an enthusiastic patron as "men certainly equal in their respective departments to any living at the time." Be that as it may, it was Northcote himself guided and directed their work, and to him fell the lion's share of the classical side of the studies. He drew up a systematic syllabus which all had to follow, and he established searching periodical examinations by the staff. To the teaching of the classics he brought all the deep insight into the literary beauty and noble thought of the great masters of Greece and Rome which had earned for him at Oxford his acknowledged authority on classical studies. To this he added a new light gained from Catholic teaching on the working of the Holy Spirit among the nations and the infiltration into Pagan minds of the remnants of Divine truth handed down from the primitive Revelation. Guiding their interpretations of the classics by this light, he taught them to discern the striving after eternal truth which the geniuses of Pagan literature express when properly interpreted.

Northcote had not a metaphysical mind, his Oxford training had not fitted him for its subtleties; he was not even a mathematician. Wisely then he left the dogmatic and philosophical side of the course followed by the Divines in the hands of Dr. Meynell, a genius of subtle though somewhat erratic mind, and a master of virile and idiomatic English prose, as all who have read his *Oscott Sermons* and his *Proteus and Amadeus* well know. Anxious that the standard of secular studies should be as well provided for as was the case in non-Catholic

schools of the same rank, he placed science and mathematics in the hands of competent men making these subjects their own. These seventeen years then of his rule were the palmy days of the College, and on their value the prestige of Oscott lasted for years after.

Knowing little of Catholic College life, he had to fall back on the experience of his Protestant youth and earlier manhood for the ideals of what such life should be and what dangers he had to anticipate and avoid. Hence it is that in his organization and in the spirit he infused into pupils and staff, one cannot fail to recognise the influence of the great master of Rugby, Dr. Thomas Arnold. Protestantism, when it took over the public schools of England, had reversed the order, if indeed it had not effaced the leading subject of the ideals of the inspired writer. "*Bonitatem et disciplinam et scientiam doce me.*" Arnold had persuaded himself of the truth of the Christian verities and their importance as the only basis of social order and human responsibility, and he founded the Rugby School upon the principles which governed school life and work in Catholic days. Northcote recognised with delight that what he had learnt to admire in Arnold's methods was not only wise and good, but the old Catholic ideal, and he set himself earnestly to carry out in Oscott the principles and methods of his old friend and college companion. The result justified the experiment, and Oscott not only continued thoroughly Catholic in tone and practical life, but also rapidly took its place among the great public schools of the country. The spirit then of Oscott under Northcote was that of the old Catholic public schools as applied to modern needs by the genius of Arnold, which Northcote was wise enough and liberal-minded enough to follow. Bishop Ullathorne could testify to the spirit of Oscott under Northcote in glowing words, and saw its root cause in Northcote himself. "The excellent spirit I found prevailing in the College, the excellent spirit in which all worked together was the spirit of one man—their President." Yes, but it was also the spirit of Arnold, and owed to his teaching and ideals its inspiration in the mind of Northcote. This is not to speak derogatorily of Northcote nor to belittle his work. It is the part of wisdom to assimilate the good and reject the evil in whatever quarter found. Things are not always best because they are new or

original. Oftener it is truer to say "the old is better."

Turning from the work and its success to the man himself, we see easily how under God the Presidency of Northcote was bound to produce the fruits it did. When all is said and done, it is the character and influence of the head that is responsible for the means used and the results of their application. The Allies won not because they were better equipped and their soldiers better material than those of Germany, for in fact they were not, but because they had the commanding genius of Foch.

Physically, he was a man of striking appearance and of surprizing vitality. Well do I remember how as a young man I gazed with awe and amazement at his massive head and shoulders, his bushy eyebrows and his broadly-dilated nostrils, prophetic of long life. When one considers that he lived to be eighty-five, during thirty years of which time he was the victim of an incurable disease, that paralysis which sapped his strength day by day so that he could be said to have died by inches as limb after limb refused to perform its appointed function, and yet up to the very last he kept intact, clear and unimpaired his mental powers, one can realize with what a huge store of vital force he had started life. Mentally also he was of outstanding capacity. He won his Oxford scholarship before he was sixteen, passed first class afterwards in Classics and "Literis Humanioribus," and would have gained a "double first" had he been able to take mathematics. His knowledge of the Fathers was second only to Newman's, and for this reason he was chosen by Ullathorne to be his theologian at the Vatican Council, where so much depended on a knowledge of Christian tradition and History. His mind was as his sermons, and controversial writings evidence saturated with the text of Holy Scripture, which he could quote aptly, fluently and accurately. Before he became a priest he had already distinguished himself by his Clifton Tracts and his editorship of the *Rambler* before that ill-starred publication came into ecclesiastical disfavour. He gave up that post to continue at Rome his studies for the priesthood. Perhaps, had he not left the *Rambler*, his learning and his judgment would have so steadied its too liberal views that it would have been spared for many years of usefulness in the Catholic cause. Truly then

from the scholar's point of view it was well said that Ullathorne had no one in his Diocese nor at his command outside of it better fitted or even equally capable for the work of piloting Oscott safely through her difficulties and restoring confidence in the minds of the Catholic laity.

But not only the laity had to be provided for. Oscott was at that time also a seminary for the priests of the Midlands, and Dr. Ullathorne was anxious not merely for the educational status of his clergy but for their training in the principles and practice of the spiritual life which is needed for the formation of the "sacerdos" called to be "alter Christus." He believed from what he knew of Northcote that he had in him a priest who would be to the young ecclesiastics under his care a living model, one in whom practice would not be divorced from theory, one who would carry out in his own life the rules and principles he taught to others, and one whose principles and teaching would be based upon the highest ideals of priestly character and work. "The lips of the priest shall keep wisdom." True, but "bonitas" comes before "scientia," and Northcote ever held this in view, and by word and example impressed it upon staff and pupils, both clerical and lay. Head and shoulders over all in the house in scholarly attainments and mental power, he had at the same time the humility of genius and a deep old-fashioned piety which, like Newman's, had a distaste for show, and for what seemed tawdry and sentimental in devotion. Perhaps in his case, as in Newman's, the stern upbringing of his youth and his impregnation with Calvinistic principles played always the part of a "complex" in these matters. He was a model of religious observance to the whole house, punctual to the religious exercises, faithful to daily meditation in the chapel morning after morning. Mortification, which to-day is one of the dropped virtues, he preached continuously and practised daily. Hence it was that during the twenty-five years of humiliation and suffering by which he was tried as gold in the furnace he became to all who knew him a model of Christian patience and resignation. Once when I ventured to remark to one who knew him intimately, "How humiliating it must be to a man of Northcote's refined character to have to suffer the indignities of his present helplessness!" He answered, "Yes, but what a saint

it has made him." To the truth of that judgment those of his household always bore eloquent testimony.

He was a man of superb mental courage. When the voice of duty called nothing daunted him. He faced the great task of the rehabilitation of Oscott with the same prompt and fearless action as he had braved a life of estrangement from family and all prospects of worldly advantage, when the call of Rome sounded in his ears, and as in after years he never blanched at the prospect of long days of loneliness and inactivity in the dreariness of a Pottery town opening out before him. When he could no longer write or use the typewriter he still preached with his old impressive dignity of diction. When he was unable to say Mass or give Communion, he spent hours in the Confessional and administered the hundred and one affairs of the parish. He never gave in, and even to the last took interest in and gave advice to others about the schools, the convent, the Church which he had built and the parish work. A born ruler of men and a strict disciplinarian, he had yet the gift of human sympathy so essential to all called to govern, and he was at all times accessible to all, students or staff or his fellow priests who sought his counsel and his encouragement. His experience and his scholarship were at everybody's call, and the charity of his purse never failed. Self-possessed and of balanced mind, he never seemed to lose his temper, but "suffered fools gladly," and it speaks volumes for his forbearance and the affection in which he was held to know that he had the one same curate for twenty-six years, though no two men could have been of more opposite natural character.

He had always, even in his old age, a charming dignity of manner and countenance, which sat easily upon him in all his moods, though he could be genial and mirth-loving as well as learned and presidential. It did not restrain or embarrass you as did the episcopal dignity and speech of Ullathorne. It struck you as something which was not acquired or the result of his position as Head of the College, but innate and natural to him. It never deserted him even in old age, when most men grow harsh with years and disappointment and the infirmities which declining years bring with them. When no longer able to walk unaided and leaning heavily

on his manservant, he came shuffling along the corridor from his sitting-room to the dining-room at the presbytery, to be fed and handled like a child, he still carried with him an atmosphere of refinement and scholastic dignity that was unmistakeable. It could not fail to impress itself upon all who came in touch with him, whether boys or professors or visitors, and its refining influence was evidenced in all who passed through his hands at Oscott. Yet though one was never embarrassed or over-restrained in his presence, still his very dignity of presence checked that undue familiarity which so easily breeds contempt, and spoils the relationship which should exist between masters and boys, heads and staffs, in public schools.

Like all good men fond of children, he could, in spite of his learning and dignity, if not because of them, take delight in the company of little ones. On his vacation he was the centre of the joy and merriment of his young nephews and nieces, as he was at other times of the convent children at Maryvale. But even in the midst of fun and gaming the dignity was still there, begetting something akin to reverence in the minds of young and old alike.

His interest in Catholic education was not bounded by his Oscott activities. He fostered to the best of his ability, by writing and lecturing, all movements for Higher Education of Catholics, especially the plea for University Courses. He gave his mind to a diligent and exhaustive study of the question, and embodied it in his report on the findings of the Special Commission appointed by the Bishops in 1872. He was convinced of the advantages and the possibility of such courses without positive danger to the faith of Catholics attending lectures and residing at Oxford or Cambridge. He did not shut his eyes to the danger arising for young minds from a common educational system with men of opposite views on religion and moral standards, but after giving to all of them due thought he decided that a possible solution was to be found in Catholic Halls under Catholic supervision, a solution since acted upon.

As he lived so he died, calmly as a child falling asleep. The tribute to his life is best given in the words of one who knew him, was under him as a student, and afterwards his Father in God, Archbishop Ilsley. " What

he has been as a priest this diocese will not readily forget. His learning, his zeal, his unceasing toil, his exemplary life, his gifts of administration, his fidelity to duty, his discharge of high office, his love and respect for his brother priests, his perfect obedience to ecclesiastical authority—all these things set him before the clergy as a noble example, so that all felt prompted to better things by his saintly influence."

What he was to the Birmingham Diocese is not the measure of his life's value. He belonged to Catholic England. When we consider what he did for the Faith in this country by his work, his example and his learning, what sacrifices he made and how his long life was crossed and re-crossed by deep long lines of suffering and sacrifice, he can well be placed high in the list of those "Men of Little Showing" whose lives are to all who come after them a stimulus and a pride.

NESTORIANS AND CHALDAEANS IN MODERN TIMES

BY THE REV. GEORGE J. MACGILLIVRAY, M.A.

IN a previous article I gave an account of the origin of the Nestorian and Chaldaean Churches and their history down to the year 1898. I must now try to give some description of their manner of life as they are now, or rather as they were at the time that I lived among them, in the years immediately preceding the Great War, and then of their adventures during the War, and of the unhappy plight to which it and subsequent events have reduced them.

I must speak more of the Nestorians than of the Chaldæans, for it was among them that I lived, and it was therefore they whom I knew best. Most, however, of what I say of the Nestorians will apply to the Chaldæans also, with a few notable exceptions. The Nestorians and the Chaldæans use the same ancient liturgy, which dates from before the Nestorian heresy, and have for the most part the same customs and the same way of life. The differences are, first, that the Chaldæans are Catholics, in communion with the Catholic Church, they have renounced the errors of Nestorianism, and their books have been purged of heretical doctrine. Secondly, they are, as I have said, mostly dwellers in the plain, while the Nestorians until recently lived in the mountains. And thirdly, the Chaldæans, as well as being Catholics, are also much more civilised and better educated than the Nestorians, having had the advantage of the excellent Dominican schools in Mosul for a long time.

The Nestorians, then, lived in that wild mountain district of Kurdistan, north of Mosul. From the point of view of scenery the country is magnificent, rugged and grand. There is perhaps nothing in the world finer than the great Shina gorge, where the river Zab flows between its immense rocky cliffs. But for those who have to make their living out of it it is not so pleasant.

The majority of the inhabitants are Kurds, who are Moslems and wholly uncivilised. The Syrians lived in

their own villages scattered among the Kurdish villages. Sometimes you would find Kurdish villages and Christian villages intermingled, in other parts there were whole districts which were almost entirely Christian, such as Tkhuma, Baz, Tiari and Jilu. The Christians were continually harassed by their Kurdish neighbours. At times there have been serious massacres. But for the most part the Kurds merely made raids on the Christians, robbing them, carrying off their sheep, and occasionally killing a few. And it was almost impossible for the Syrians to get any redress from the Turkish Government, which always favoured Moslems in all disputes with Christians.

They were miserably poor. With great difficulty they cultivated little patches of ground round the villages. They had a primitive system of irrigation, leading the water in channels from the neighbouring streams to the fields. In the warmer parts they grew rice and maize, in others wheat, millet and other kinds of grain. Otherwise they were dependent on the produce of their flocks of sheep and goats, which fed on the mountains. All their implements were very primitive. In fact I should say that most of them had not changed for thousands of years. They had wooden ploughs with an iron point, drawn by oxen. Many of their operations were very interesting to the Biblical student, illustrating the customs of which we read in Holy Scripture. You could see, for example, the oxen treading out the corn, and the winnower with his "fan" in his hand, the "fan," in fact, being a sort of wooden shovel, with which the grain is tossed into the air, so that the chaff is carried away by the wind, and the good grain falls back on to the threshing floor.

Their food consisted of meat occasionally, when a sheep was killed, various dishes made from the different kinds of grain, eggs, cheese, butter, and the curious curdled milk, which is universal throughout the Near East, which the Turks call yaghourt, the Arabs leben, and the Syrians mesta. Their clothing was peculiar and strikingly picturesque. They wore loose baggy trousers, a voluminous girdle twined round the waist, and a sort of shirt, all of various bright and gay colours. Then over the shirt they wore a little short jacket made of a white woollen material rather like felt, and a tall peaked hat of the same material, which often had a kind of turban wound round it. The clothing of the priests was the same

as that of the laymen, except that they affected rather dark colours, and they always wore a beard.

The houses were built of stone. The flat roof was made by laying across the top of the walls trunks of poplar trees, then smaller pieces of wood, then a quantity of brushwood, and finally a thick layer of mud, which was rolled hard. There were no windows, properly so called, but a number of small unglazed openings in the walls, which not only admitted air and a certain amount of light, but could be used as loop-holes, through which the occupants could shoot in case of attack. They were without chimneys, the smoke from the fire finding its way out, more or less, through the numerous apertures. The floors were of mud, and the entire furniture consisted of a few mats, and some quilts, in which they wrapped themselves at night.

The Patriarch, Mar Shimun, lived, as I have said, in Qudshanis, a village in the most inaccessible part of the mountains, 6,000 feet above the sea. There he held his court, administering both ecclesiastical and civil affairs, for, according to the Turkish system, he was recognised as the civil ruler of the Nestorian *melet* or nation. Hence a great amount of business of all sorts was continually being transacted there. There was a constant coming and going of people from all parts, coming for advice and direction in all kinds of affairs, for the settlement of disputes, and so forth. Every morning and afternoon Mar Shimun would go to the village church for the daily prayers, and after the afternoon prayers he would sit in his *diwan* and receive all comers. Very curious gatherings they were, all sorts of visitors (men only, of course) sitting round on the floor drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes and discussing the news from the various districts, as well as occasional rumours from the outside world.

The churches were as primitive as the houses. They were built of stone, roofed with wood and mud, and had the usual mud floors. A curious feature was the very low door, not much more than about three feet high, so that it was necessary to bend double to get in. Two explanations of this custom were given. One was that, by forcing the worshipper to bend low on entering the church, you teach him the necessity of approaching God with due reverence and humility. The other, and more likely reason, was that the doors were so constructed in order

to prevent the Kurds from using the churches as stables for their beasts.

The interior of the church was simple and primitive in the extreme. There were no seats, and no ornaments except a row of curtains, generally very ancient and dilapidated, forming a screen for the sanctuary. There were no pictures or statues. Outside the sanctuary screen there were three little stone tables. On one lay a little metal cross, and on another the Book of the Gospels, each of which was devoutly kissed by all who entered the church. The third table was merely a receptacle for other service books and so forth. There was also a sort of lectern, which was a rough wooden table with about as much beauty of construction as a carpenter's bench. In the sanctuary there was the altar, which was merely a recess hollowed out of the wall, rather like a niche for a statue, only rather wider. It had no ornaments except a small cross which lay on it. The altar lights were bits of wax taper, which were stuck against the wall on either side, adhering by their own wax.

The vestments were equally primitive. Essentially they are the same as our own, consisting of alb, girdle, maniple, stole and chasuble. But they are made of white linen ornamented with red and blue pieces sewn on in curious patterns round the edges. The chasuble is little more than a sheet, which is worn after the manner of a cope, but quite loose, so that at certain parts of the Mass it can be drawn over the head.

The Nestorians have three liturgies, the most generally used being that of the "Holy Apostles Addai and Mari," the others being the liturgy of "St." Nestorius and that of "St." Theodore. These form a group by themselves, the East Syrian Rite, which differs in many respects from all the other groups of liturgies. It is probably derived from a primitive Antiochene rite, which came to Edessa, and was there evolved into its present form. It contains no trace of Nestorianism. There are, however, two very peculiar features. One is that in the Liturgy of the Holy Apostles, the normal rite, the words of institution do not occur, although they do in the other two. It looks as if such emphasis was laid on the epiklesis that they considered the recitation of the words of institution as a matter of indifference. I believe that many of the Nestorian priests insert the words, and they say that they

are left out through reverence, because they were too sacred to write down. But in fact the liturgy reads as if they had never been there, and were not intended to be said, for putting them in makes a rather awkward break in what otherwise runs continuously. I very much doubt whether all the Nestorian priests insert the words. I need hardly say that the Uniate Chaldæans all do.

The other remarkable feature is the Holy Leaven. The tradition is that from the Last Supper the Apostles took away with them a portion of the Blessed Sacrament, that they mixed this, along with some of the blood which fell from our Lord's body on the cross, with flour, and so made the leaven with which to leaven the bread for the Mass. Every Maundy Thursday what remained of the holy leaven was mixed with fresh flour, and used to leaven the bread during the ensuing year. And so there is a sort of continuity between the bread used at every Mass and the Last Supper. All the Apostles had the leaven and handed it on to the Churches which they founded. But all the Western Churches somehow were careless enough to lose it. Only the East Syrians have kept the leaven brought to them by St. Thomas.

Besides the Liturgy proper there are a number of other liturgical books containing the rites for the administration of the sacraments, the daily prayers and other services. Many of them are of later origin and full of heresy.

The Mass is, of course, the principal service. The Syrians call it either *Qurbana* or *Razi*. *Razi* means "the Mysteries." *Qurbana* is the word which is familiar to us from the Gospels in the form *Corban*, and means "the Offering."

With regard to the sacraments, it is a very curious fact that, although the Nestorians are quite sure that they are seven in number, they are not very clear as to which the seven are, being rather confused about the difference between sacraments and sacramentals. One list gives Holy Orders, the consecration of a church, Baptism and Holy Oil (i.e. Confirmation), the *Qurbana*, the blessing of monks, the office for the dead and marriage. Another enumerates Holy Order, Baptism, Holy Oil, *Qurbana*, Absolution, the Holy Leaven and the Holy and Life-giving Cross.

The Blessed Sacrament is not reserved, and so sick

persons cannot receive Holy Communion. When a person is sick, the priest visits him and "reads the Gospel on his head," as the phrase is.

The practice of Confession has fallen entirely into disuse, although it is quite clear that they once had it. There is a curious substitute in what is called the *takhsha dkhusa*, which is a form of absolution administered in public, but without any confession. It is mostly used in the case of persons who have fallen into some grave open sin, or who have neglected for a long time to come to the sacraments. They simply come forward publicly in the church, thus making an implicit avowal of contrition, and receive absolution in the prescribed form. It is also used for those who have become Papists, repented and wish to return to the true Nestorian fold.

Monasticism has also disappeared. There certainly at one time were a number of monasteries, but they have ceased to exist. All that remains is that a few individuals become what are called *Rabbani*, which means that they remain unmarried and live a kind of religious life in the world, devoting themselves as far as possible to prayer and good works.

The Nestorians make a great point of fasting. About the worst sin that a man can commit is to "eat the fast," as they call it. And the Lenten fast is very severe. No meat is allowed, even on Sundays, no eggs, no milk, no animal product of any kind. And in a country where the fare is rather meagre at all times, this reduces the Lenten diet to very small proportions. Bread, beans and various kinds of grain are all that can be taken. In addition to this they eat nothing before midday, and some of them not until the evening.

I have already shown that there is no doubt that the Nestorians are officially committed to heresy. But now, what of the actual beliefs of the people? And what of their religious condition in general?

In answer to these questions first it must be said that they are for the most part extremely ignorant. Various missions have been doing educational work among them for a good many years, but their work has been mostly confined to the towns, Mosul and Urmi. They hardly touched the mountain districts where, between the coming of the Russians and the War, most of the Nestorians lived.

Their own traditional method of education was this. The village priest would pick out a few bright boys in his village and teach them to read. First he would teach them the alphabet, and then they would proceed to the Psalter, which was usually the first reading book. They would read this, of course, in the Old Syriac, which is very different from the language now spoken. It was impossible to do anything else, because they have no books in the modern language. But, as Old Syriac differs as much from the vernacular of to-day as Latin does from French, the boys understood nothing of what they were reading. They merely learned to make sounds which to them were quite unintelligible. But, when a boy could do this, he was supposed to have received a sound education, and was ready to be ordained deacon. If he wished to continue his education, however, the priest would next teach him to translate the Old Syriac into the language of to-day. And finally he might learn to write. Beyond that no further education was thinkable.

The result of all this was that in every village there were a few men who could read, and they were nearly always deacons. In fact it was chiefly in order to be deacons that they learned to read. In the Nestorian Church, as in all the Oriental Churches, a priest cannot say Mass without the assistance of two deacons. Therefore it was necessary to have at least two or three deacons in every village. Most of the deacons never proceeded to the priesthood. There was no further training for the priesthood. When a priest died, the chief men of the village would choose one of their deacons to succeed him, and then simply take him to the bishop and request him to ordain him.

Preaching, or any attempt to give religious instruction to the people, was almost unknown. I have occasionally heard a priest during Mass translate the Gospel into the modern language with a sort of running commentary. But for the most part they were content to say Mass and administer the sacraments and other rites. For the rest of their time they had to work in the fields like other people. So that most of the people just picked up what knowledge they had of their religion in a casual way, as they would pick up any other traditions. Most of them, however, seemed to have a fairly good knowledge of the elements. They knew something about our Lord's life,

and the meaning and purpose of such sacraments as they used, and of the moral law. In the matter of morals the general standard was decidedly high — considerably higher, for example, than that of England. Their defects were those which are common to all nations who have lived for centuries in a state of servitude oppressed by an alien power, that is to say, untruthfulness, jealousy of one another, quarrelsomeness, and general crookedness in their dealings. Having for so long found it necessary to live by outwitting a strong oppressor, they are incapable of behaving in a straightforward manner, but must always employ underhand and circuitous methods of getting what they want.

Whatever their defects, however, there is one fact which redounds to their everlasting credit, that they have in them the spirit of martyrdom. In no circumstances will they apostatise. They are quite willing to be martyrs, and they not infrequently do lay down their lives for Christ. I have myself known at least one clear case in which a man was captured by the Kurds and given the choice between apostasy and death. He unhesitatingly chose death, and was shot.

But now we come back to the question of their heresy. Apart from the catchwords of controversy, what is their real belief about our Lord? I am convinced that it is perfectly orthodox. This is well illustrated by an incident which happened to one of the Archbishop of Canterbury's missionaries. One day, about Christmas time, he was sitting in Mar Shimun's diwan, when somebody mentioned the legend that, when our Lord was born, the beasts in the stable came round the manger and knelt to worship Him. The Englishman asked an old priest, the Archdeacon of Qudshanis, whether he thought that the story was true. "Of course it is true," he at once replied; "how should they not worship their Creator?" Now, whatever the truth or otherwise of the legend, a man who could hold that view of it was not a Nestorian at heart. A real Nestorian could not refer to the Child in the manger quite simply as the Creator.

The fact is that their heresy to-day consists simply in an obstinate adherence to the old catchwords of Nestorianism. Their fathers honoured Nestorius as a saint, therefore they will do the same. Their fathers believed in "two *Qnumi*," therefore they will say "two *Qnumi*."

Their fathers said that our Lady was not the Mother of God, but only the "Mother of Christ," therefore they decline to accept the orthodox phrase, although their actual devotion to our Lady leaves nothing to be desired, and they even use expressions about her which we should consider rather extravagant.

In a word, their heresy is little more than a clinging to independence, an exaggerated nationalism. They cling to the catchwords as the sign of, and excuse for, their independence. Consequently their attitude to the Catholic Church is a peculiar one. When a Nestorian becomes a Catholic, he is not regarded as having changed his faith, but merely as having gone over to another party, the anti-national party, and so you have the very unsatisfactory state of affairs, that individual Syrians and groups of Syrians will go over from one side to the other and back again, just as they think that they are going to get more effectual political and financial support on one side or the other. Of course this attitude is not confined to the Nestorians. It is characteristic of all the Oriental sects. This is what explains the recently changed attitude of many of the "Orthodox" towards the Church of England, and their acceptance, for example, of the validity of Anglican Orders. Since the Russian revolution they have lost the very powerful political and financial support of Russia, and are consequently in a very bad way. Their greatest hope seems now to be in England, and to gain English support they are willing to say anything that will oblige.

I must now conclude with a brief account of what happened to the Nestorians during the War, and their present position.

When Turkey came into the War, the Syrians decided to throw in their lot with the allies, and rose against the Turks. For a long time they held their ground amongst the mountains, repelling all the attacks of the Turks and Kurds. But by the autumn of 1915 they had been driven to take refuge on one of the high plateaux used as summer pastures, where it was impossible to live during the winter. After many attempts to get help from Russia, which was promised but never came, they resolved on desperate measures. They made an attack on a part of the Turkish line where the country was so rugged that no attack there was thought possible. They succeeded,

however, in breaking through in a body, with their women and children, and getting over into Persia. There they joined up with the Russians, who supplied them with more rifles and ammunition.

So all went well until Russia collapsed. Then they were again left stranded. And, to make matters worse, Mar Shimun was treacherously murdered by a Kurdish chief named Simko, who had been their ally, but now, on the failure of Russia, made terms with the Turks. They continued, however, to defend themselves for a considerable time, until their ammunition began to run short. Then, just when things were beginning to look desperate, a British aeroplane arrived from the south, telling them of the British advance in Mesopotamia. They resolved that the only way to safety was to get into touch with the British army, and so the whole people, men, women and children, trekked southwards. It is said that about half of them were killed or died on the way. But some forty or fifty thousand eventually reached Mesopotamia, and were lodged in a great refugee camp at Baquba, near Baghdad. The able-bodied men were then enrolled under British officers in what was called the "Assyrian Levy," which did good service during the rest of the war against the Turks, and was useful afterwards in the troubles that ensued with the Kurds.

The Nestorians hoped that, when the general settlement came after the War, they would be able to go back to their own country, and be recognized by the League of Nations as an independent State. The League, however, turned down the proposal, and decided that they should return as subjects of Turkey. In other words, that august body invited them to go back and be massacred. Naturally they declined to do so, and the great bulk of them remain settled in Iraq.

The present Patriarch is the nephew of the one who was murdered by Simko. His immediate successor was his younger brother, Zeia, but he unfortunately developed lung trouble and died after a very short reign. Then their nephew Ishai was consecrated. I think he must have been about twelve years old at the time of his consecration, and is now, I should say, about twenty-two. I knew him as a little boy of five just before the War. Both he and the Chaldæan Patriarch now reside at Mosul.

At the present time it is estimated that there are about 200,000 Christians in Iraq. The great majority are Chaldæan Uniates. There are about 40,000 Nestorians, and small bodies of Jacobites, Syrian Catholics and Armenians. At the present moment they are all looking with considerable anxiety to the future, when the British power is withdrawn. Christians have never fared very well as subjects of a Moslem power, and the fact of their having had temporary British protection will make their position all the worse, when that protection ceases.

What the prospects are of the Nestorians, now that they are settled in Iraq, being united with the Chaldæans, and so returning once more to the unity of the Catholic Church, I do not know. But I notice that Dr. Wigram, a former head of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Assyrian Mission, in a book recently published, expresses the fear that that may happen. It would certainly be the best thing that they could do, from every point of view, quite apart from the supreme advantage of being united once more with the Catholic Church. Through association with the Chaldæans they would gradually be brought up to their level of civilisation and culture, which is so much higher than their own. And they would have the strength that comes from unity.

HOMILETICS

BY THE REV. J. O. MORGAN, D.D., Ph.D., L.S.S.

Tenth Sunday after Pentecost (August 2nd).

Gospel. (Luke xviii. 9-14.)

It is impossible to assign the exact circumstances in which Our Lord gave utterance to this parable. Possibly it was during His last journey down the Valley of the Jordan, along the frontiers of Perea to Jerusalem (see notes for thirteenth Sunday after Pentecost), but most probably St. Luke has linked it to the eschatological discourse which precedes, by reason of the association of the ideas. The parable is directed towards the enlightenment of *some who trusted in themselves as just* ("just" in the O.T. sense of "observers of the Law"), an audience, therefore, who were afflicted with over-confidence arising from a conviction of their own justice, or with self-sufficiency in their own ability to acquire justice, in either case with a certain over-estimation of their own righteousness, who, therefore, *despised others*. It was, of course, necessary to observe the Law to be righteous, but clearly mere formal and outward observance of the Law could not constitute real holiness. The immediate audience of the parable, therefore, is probably the same as in Luke xvi. 15—the Pharisees.

Our Lord sketches a tableau in which two characteristic types of His day, the Pharisee, the "unco' guid," and the Publican, the extortionary tax-farmer, play the leading parts. They *go up to the Temple*, necessarily, because all approach to Mount Sion is from a lower level, *to pray*, not indeed for a liturgical function but for private prayer (Is. lxvi. 7). They stand together in the Porch of the Gentiles beyond which it was death for the Publican to go. This Publican evidently, unlike most of his colleagues, was a Jew, or at least a "proselyte of the gate."

The Pharisee, *standing*—a typical attitude of self-righteous ostentation (Mt. vi. 5)—*prays within himself*, not therefore a liturgical prayer, yet one perfectly in keeping with the teaching of the tract Berachoth of the Mishna. It is at once a reflection of the inner man—"ascendit orare, noluit Deum rogare, sed se laudare. Parum est, non Deum rogare, sed se laudare, insuper et roganti insultare" (St. Augustine, Sermo 115)—and typical of his class. He is *not like the rest of men*, the non-Pharisees. The very name "Pharisees" (P'rishaiia, "the separated," "the segregated") invented first in derision of the sect but later readily accepted by them as a title as descriptive as it was honourable, indicates their pride in odious class-distinction arising from their legalistic conception of holiness. They despised, not the gentiles alone, but even their own connationals, the 'am ha-arez, the "common-folk," whose very

toil for bread shut them off from the fastidious formalities of the Pharisaical forensic justice.

The Pharisee *fasts twice a week*; he *gives tithes of everything*. He voices in his own praise the principal positive aspects of the Pharisaical legalistic holiness. He voluntarily exceeds the obligations of the Law both in regard to God and in regard to himself. Instead of the yearly fast (Lev. xvi. 29 and Numb. xxix. 7), he fasts twice a week, on Monday and Thursday (because, according to the tract Ta'anith, Moses went up to receive the Law on Thursday and returned on Monday): instead of a tithe of the first-fruits (Ex. xxii. 29 and parallels), he gives a tithe of everything that accrues to him. He is, in fact, the beau-ideal of Pharisaism. (See Edersheim.)

Our Lord presents a striking contrast in the Publican, who takes up his position (*ἐσῶς* not *σταθῶς*) *afar off* (from what? the opening of the gate? the first ranks of the ostentatious self-righteous?), anyway, in a place apart, of humble retirement. His attitude is consonant with his station. He *would not so much as lift up his eyes towards heaven*, certainly a sign of humility and self-depreciation, for, while the Jews elevated the arms in prayer, the rabbinical rule of casting down the eyes is of later date. *He struck his breast*, the symbol of repentance usual among the Orientals. His demeanour mirrors his prayer: *Oh God, be merciful to me a sinner* (literally *the sinner*, the sinner *par excellence* in his own estimation or the sinner in public esteem by reason of his trade), a prayer revealing no self-deception, no self-flattery, but only a realization of unworthiness and a humble hope for pardon.

It is possible that some of the audience, themselves Pharisees, might well sympathize with the Pharisee; he was but practising what they preached. While, however, the contrast is too accentuated to be misunderstood, Our Lord drives home the inevitable verdict with emphasis: *I say to you, the Publican was justified rather than the other*. The Pharisee might well possess, and rejoice in, his legalistic justice, but the Publican received interior justification, because *he that humbleth himself in this world shall be exalted in the Messianic Kingdom*.

The point, therefore, of the Master's argument is that a penitent sinner is more acceptable in the eyes of God than the proud, self-reliant, self-esteeming "just," who simply because he exceeds the demands of the law, believes he has acquired for himself the cachet of righteousness. The essential lesson of the parable is the necessity of humility. It is the condition required for entrance into the Messianic Kingdom; it is the "nuptial garment" (Mt. xxii. 11). God resists the proud and gives grace to the humble (I Pet. v. 5; James iv. 6). "Our sufficiency is from God" (II Cor. iii. 5); and "not by the works of justice we have done" (I Tim. iii. 4). It is not mere deeds that count; it is the humble and contrite spirit. That is the lesson we have to learn from the Master Himself, Who was "meek and humble of heart" (Mt. xi. 29). "The citadel

of his heart," says St. Cyprian, "which the Pharisee sought in vain to keep by fasting and alms-deeds, he threw open by his pride" (Moral. xix. 33).

Intimately, though not directly, connected with the principal purpose of the parable is the lesson of the necessity and efficacy of humble prayer. It was the humble prayer coming from the humble heart that won the Publican his justification. "The prayer of him that humbleth himself shall pierce the clouds" (Eccles. xxxv. 21).

This parable, too, provides precious evidence for the course of the sinner's justification. While the Pharisee is so blinded by self-satisfaction that he can discern nothing but perfection in himself (cf. Eccles. vii. 21; I John i. 8), the Publican can see nothing but his own imperfection. Shame follows upon this realization of his own unworthiness, then self-depreciation, then contrition for the past coupled with the hope of forgiveness and the humble prayer for pardon.

Eleventh Sunday after Pentecost (August 9th).

Gospel. (Mark vii. 31-37.)

After the Jews began to conspire against Him, Our Lord left Judea and withdrew to Galilee (John vii. 1). Even here He is not left in peace. A deputation from the Sanhedrin now appears in Capharnaum (Lk. vii. 1). To escape their unwelcome attentions (possibly merely to avoid the gathering multitudes [Lk. vi. 31]) He went to Tyre, then North to Sidon, whence an easy road led to Tiberias, South and West of which lay Decapolis, the confederation of free cities. Here on the shores of the Lake, where some little time before He had multiplied the bread, the crowds again cluster around Him (Mt. xv. 30) to seek His merciful ministrations. St. Mark narrates one of these episodes of healing.

They bring Him one deaf and dumb, one in whom a grave impediment of speech (at least) was superadded to the affliction of deafness. *They besought Him that He would lay His hand upon him*, probably on the advice of a Jew who knew the Lord's usual custom (Mk. i. 31; v. 23, 41; vi. 5). Our Lord *took him apart from the crowd*. Why, it is hard to say—perhaps to decline human vain-glory, perhaps to prevent His miracle becoming merely a "nine-days-wonder" (possibly the pagan Decapolitans might attribute it to mere magic), perhaps simply because crowds are ill-suited for the operations of the supernatural. *He put His fingers into his ears*, an action obviously symbolic of breaking down the barriers of hearing. *He touched his tongue with saliva*, an action indicative of loosening (cf. Ps. cxxxvi. 6). *He looked up to heaven*; it was habitual with Our Lord either by His prayer or His gesture to refer His miracles to His Father. *He groaned*, either in pity for the misery wrought by the jealousy of Satan and the sin of the Proto-parents, or possibly because the groan was itself a prayer (Rom.

vii. 23, 26). He said to him: *Ephpheta*. The apt Aramaic word *Ethp'tah* (the form *Ethpe'el* of patah, which means both "to open" and "to loose") is retained in the narrative, not because of any particular virtue in the word itself, but because it remained vividly impressed upon the mind of Mark, the "interpretes Petri," who frequently heard the Prince of Apostles give utterance to it in his catecheses.

There follows immediately the miracle, great in any case, but stupendous if the man was deaf and dumb from birth; it would then involve the bestowal of hearing, speech and an infused knowledge of the vernacular. *And He charged them that they should tell no man*. Why? It is difficult to say. It might be possibly lest a false expectation of the Kingdom should spring into being among the Decapolitans (cf. John vi. 15), possibly to avoid comparison with the ostentatious charlatans of the period, who posed as the Messias, and to make the crowds realize that miracles might well be a part of His Mission, but not the whole; more probably, however, it was in pursuance of the Master's policy at this time of avoiding open conflict with the Jews, since He knew that the crowds would behave as before (Mt. ix. 31). Still, why issue the command when He knew that the crowds would not in fact obey? But, then, why did God give any commandments? Maldonatus surmises the reason to be: "*facit ille quod debet quodque in se est, quamvis non ignoret nos quod debemus quodque in nobis est minime facturos.*" Whatever be the explanation, the prohibition actually increased the clamorous admiration of the crowd, who vent it in words reminiscent of the prophecy of Isaias (xxv. 5), in which in fact Our Lord's oracle *Ephpheta* is embodied (cf. Mt. xv. 31).

St. Augustine sees in this episode a reproof of the laziness of Christians in the service of God, since even they who were actually forbidden, mere pagans, could not refrain from magnifying His Name.

Most apt of the many applications of this miracle, because of the symbolic gesture, is Baptism, in which the "reborn" Christian is taken apart from "the children of wrath" (Eph. ii. 3), his ears are opened to the Word of God and his tongue loosened to the profession of faith.

Twelfth Sunday after Pentecost (August 16th).

Gospel. (Luke x. 23-27.)

"*Blessed are the eyes that see the things which you see,*" said Our Lord, because the disciples are precisely the *little ones* (of verse 21), simple, unassuming, faithful souls, to whom the Father was pleased to reveal what He had hidden from the *wise and prudent*, the doctors of the Law and the Pharisees, who were eaten up with the conceit of their own self-sufficiency. The disciples are favoured above *kings*, such as David and those scions of his line, who, like David and unlike Achaz (Isaias vii.),

believed in the Messianic promises, and the *Prophets*, who uttered the Messianic oracles, for the disciples had seen and heard what the *prophets and kings have desired to see and to hear*—the inauguration of the Messianic Kingdom and the stupendous wonders of the Incarnation.

The evangelist proceeds at once, without any apparent connection of ideas, to the episode of the Doctor of the Law (distinct and independent of the incident in Mk. xii and Mt. xxii). The setting of this discussion is not given. We may legitimately surmise, however, that it took place on the Jericho road not far from Bethany in close proximity to Jerusalem. Despite the refusal of the Samaritans to permit Him transit, Our Lord had "set His face" towards Jerusalem (Luke ix. 51 and 53). He had therefore come southwards by the valley of Jordan along Perea, forded the river at Jericho and then gone North towards Jerusalem. This would not only lend local colour to the parable, but also it seems to be substantiated by the fact that immediately after the parable He enters the house of Martha and Mary at Bethany (Lk. x, 38).

The Scribe in this case, a bumptious, self-confident person, as the context would indicate, appears to have proposed a "poser" to Our Lord, a practical difficulty, *tempting Him*, putting Him to the test, rather than to have sought to spring a snare the better to involve Him with the schools and thus discredit Him, as did his colleagues on several other occasions. In reply, therefore, to his query: *What must I do to possess life?*—whose answer he obviously thought he knew better than the Person he asked—Our Lord naturally refers him to *what is written in the Law*. The scribe equally obviously replies by quoting Deuteronomy (vi. 5): *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God*, etc., which was incorporated in the Chma recited twice daily by the observant Jew. Strangely enough, however, the doctor goes on to add the words of Leviticus (xiv. 18) on the love of one's neighbour. This found no place in the Chma. Moreover, while the Old Testament is eloquent concerning the works of mercy towards the neighbour, even the stranger, the Jews, misled by their exclusivist nationalism, limited their concept of neighbour to their own countrymen, and the Pharisees, by their formalistic fastidiousness, circumscribed the idea of neighbourliness even more closely, admitting within it only those who were bound to them by the ties of blood or intimate friendship (Mt. v. 43).

Thus it would appear that the scribe in his answer reproduced the Lord's own teaching the better to trip Him later on the identity of the neighbour. The Master applauds his answer—naturally: *Do this and thou shalt possess eternal life*; not only does He thus approve the injunctions of the Old Law, possibly citing the Law to the lawyer (cf. Lev. xviii. 5 and xix. 18), but enunciates also the whole content of the New (Gal. v. 14). The Scribe now advances the *clou* of his argument. He knew the rest; this is his real objection: "*And who is my neighbour?*" He is seeking to *justify himself*, to show that there was indeed

point in his question. Our Lord answers him with the Parable of the Good Samaritan.

A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho. The road to Jericho, a good twelve hours' journey on foot, is in fact all down hill until it reaches the level of the Dead Sea, a desolate, rocky road, winding between arid defiles, through the Wilderness of Juda. Up to our own times it was dangerous by reason of its loneliness and facility of access to the Bedawin. The same fate befell the traveller that befell many another. He was robbed and the robbers stripped him, as the Bedawin still do, but they also beat him, probably because he defended himself and his goods. *A certain priest and a levite*, returning from their *vices* in the Temple, chance by. With scarce a glance they pass on. Our Lord makes no comment on their conduct, a supreme touch of narrational artistry which throws the inhumanity and selfishness of these two, whose profession should have made them the exponents of the Law in its fullest and best sense, into higher relief. Then comes a *Samaritan* about his lawful occasions. Our Lord introduces, again with superb artistry, this Samaritan, who, of course, would cordially detest, and be detested by, the Jews, in order to propose a concrete example where the exercise of charity would be most difficult by reason of racial antipathy and therefore at once all the more beautiful and compelling.

The Samaritan is *moved with compassion*. He renders first aid. He treats the sufferer's wounds with *oil and wine*, provisions he had with him for his journey. He knew, as all Easterns know, the cleansing and astringent properties of wine and the emollient effect of oil, which together constitute what is still known as Samaritan's Balsam. He sets the wounded man on his *beast*, probably an ass, because we gather he is poor. He brings him *to an inn*—the Khân-el-Hatrûr midway between Jerusalem and Jericho is pointed out to the pilgrim as the Inn of the Good Samaritan—but while a khan was usually a three-sided court, providing nothing more than shelter and protection for man and beast, this one possessed a *host*, probably an enterprising individual who took advantage of the importance of the road and the position of the khan to supply unwary travellers with necessities. Here *he took care of him* during the night.

Next morning he gave *two pence*, two denarii (not a particularly ample sum, since we know from the Parable of the Vineyard that one denarius was a labourer's daily wage) to the host *to take care of him* and promised to refund *whatsoever shall be over and above* on his return, lest the sick man be neglected or importuned. Evidently the Samaritan's purse was not as big as his heart: he could afford neither to give more nor delay his journey.

Which therefore was the neighbour to him who fell among the the robbers? The answer is obvious even to the captious scribe: *He that showed mercy.* Then comes the direct application of the parable: *Go, says Our Lord, and do thou in like manner.*

It is obvious that Our Lord did not return a direct answer to the scribe's question. A direct answer would have exposed Him to the necessity of replying to an infinity of speculative objections which the scribe was clearly prepared to advance. This parable cut the ground from beneath his feet. The answer, though indirect, was conclusive. The concrete case proposed by the Master swept clean across all theoretical and speculative niceties. It was the practical solution of the problem.

The point therefore of the parable is not so much the precise identity of one's neighbour as the significance of the love of one's neighbour. Our Lord had proposed a case where the exercise of this love is most difficult. The inference from the conduct of the Samaritan, who rising superior to all considerations of racial enmity, personal convenience, even of poverty, could succour the suffering just because of the suffering, is obvious (and the scribe saw that it was obvious, since he agreed): there is no human being to whom the name of "neighbour" is not applicable. Clearly, if a Samaritan could so bear himself towards a Jew, his hereditary and inveterate enemy, if all, even the captious scribe, be urged by the common instinct of humanity to praise his conduct, then clearly the term "neighbour" embraces two correlatives: he that suffers necessity and he that succours the necessitous, and every one is the neighbour of everyone else.

The parable in its literal sense provides excellent and ample matter for sermons on Christian Charity, in its mystical sense, on Redemption—all the ancient Fathers use it in this sense—and on the conversion of sinners. Thus Origen: (Hom. 35 in Lucam) "Aiebat quidam . . . hominem qui descendit esse Adam, Jerusalem paradisum, Jericho mundum, latrones contrarias fortitudines, sacerdotem legem, Levitem prophetas, Samaritem Christum, vulnera vero inobedientiam, animal corpus Domini, pandochium id est stabulum quod universos volentes intoire suscipiat, Ecclesiam interpretari; porro duos denarios Patrem et Filium intellegi, stabularium Ecclesiae praesidem, cui dispensatio credita est; de eo vero quod Samarites reversurum se esse promittit, secundum Salvatoris figurabat adventum." A sermon on Christ, the sinner's Good Samaritan, could be developed on these lines: The sinner "goes down" from God to the world; he falls among robbers, "the concupiscence of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh and the pride of life," (I John ii. 16) who strip him of grace, wound him by weakening his will, obscuring his spiritual perception and leave him half-dead of supernatural life; Christ, the stranger, becomes man, makes sacrifice for him and in His compassion provides the remedies of sin and entrusts to His Church the care of the sinner.

Thirteenth Sunday after Pentecost (August 23rd).

Gospel. (Luke xvii. 11-19).

After the raising of Lazarus, the Sanhedrin decreed the death

of the Divine Master, whereupon He withdrew to Ephrem (John xi. 47). He is now making His way to Jerusalem by short stages (Luke ix. 58 and xiii. 22), passing *through the midst of the coasts, i.e.,* along the confines, of Samaria and Galilee with the intention of reaching the valley of the Jordan along which He could pass to Jericho without entering the territory of the Samaritans, who had refused Him transit (Luke xi. 51), or Judæa, where His life was threatened. He reaches a *certain town*, an unnamed village on the frontier, which tradition identifies as Jenin. Outside, ten men, *who stood afar off*, because they were lepers and could neither enter the village nor approach Him (Lev. xiii. 45, 46; and Numb. v. 2) call to Him for pity and relief. All plead for all—a pious conspiracy of faith. The Divine Healer at the sight of their plight (and knowing the faith that moved them) replies: *Go, show yourselves to the priests*. He is willing to intervene in their regard by a divine act of mercy, but not that His divine intervention should excuse them from the obligations of the Law (Lev. xiii. and xiv.): He came “not to destroy but to fulfil” the Law (Matt. v. 17). He has not yet healed them, but the promise of their cure is contained in His command. (How often is the answer to prayer merely seemingly deferred!) It is the test of their faith which in the event meets its requital.

All had confidence in Him; only one had gratitude. *When he saw he was made clean*, this one returned immediately, evidently without approaching the priests, loudly *glorifying God*. He prostrates himself before the Healer—the profound salaam is still the sign in the East of the deepest veneration—*giving thanks*. He was a Samaritan, more hated by the Jews than a gentile. Tribulation brings strange bed-fellows and racial antagonism was forgotten in mutual misery.

Our Lord questions him, not indeed for information, since the questions show that He is fully aware of all that has happened, but rhetorically the better to throw into relief the carelessness and ingratitude of the nine Jews. Perhaps they had taken it all for granted—were they not the sons of Abraham, the heirs of the Promises? But was not that all the more reason for gratitude? Like Naaman, the gentile (IV Kings v. 14) grateful alike to God and to Eliseus, the servant of God, the one, the Samaritan, the *stranger* (the outcast) praises God indeed but returns also to thank his Healer. Many receive gifts, says Maldonatus, but few prove their gratitude by their deeds. The behaviour of the Samaritan is the condemnation of the neglect and the ingratitude of the Jews. The Master in re-enunciating the power of faith confirms the obligation of gratitude and dismisses him: *Go thy way, thy faith*, that unshakable, unbounded trust and confidence in the Power, Mercy and Goodness of God, that faith which works miracles (Luke xvii. 6) and causes miracles to be worked (Mark ix. 23) *has made thee whole*.

St. Luke, the companion of the Apostle of the Gentiles, alone

records this incident of the gratitude of the "stranger" and its approval by the Master doubtless as an encouragement to the "public" to whom his Gospel was addressed. It points the moral that while Christ is the Saviour of all men (Rom. viii. 32) the gentiles could hope, not alone to outvie the Jews in faith and gratitude to God, but even to be accepted by Him in place of the Chosen People. (Compare Isaias v., which is also applicable to gratitude to God for, and correspondence with, His favours.) This is probably the reason why many of the Fathers see in the Samaritan a figure of the gentiles, who were to receive the good tidings of the Messianic Kingdom more readily and with greater appreciation than the Jews.

The episode of the Ten Lepers is also a favourite illustration with preachers of the method which Christ instituted for the forgiveness of sin—Confession—partly because of the plea for mercy, partly because of His command and partly because of the obvious parallels between leprosy and sin, the "living deaths" of body and soul.

Fourteenth Sunday after Pentecost (August 30).

Gospel. (Matthew vi. 24-33).

To-day's Gospel is part of the Sermon on the Mount, falling within that section in which Our Lord discusses the characteristics of the subjects of the Kingdom of Heaven. The Divine Master is seated on the slopes of Kurûn Hattin—the traditional Mount of Beatitudes on the Western Shore of Tiberias—the crowds are assembled about Him. He enunciates a general principle: *no man can serve two masters*. It is impossible to compromise between two allegiances: it is impossible to give whole-hearted service when loyalty is divided. *You cannot serve God and Mammon*; what is true in life is true in the service of God. You cannot compromise between God and gain. Mammon, money-lust, the "covetousness which is the service of idols" (Col. iii. 5) is proposed in antithesis with the Almighty as the personification of the money-god idolized by the world. You cannot reconcile greed for gold with zeal for God. You must seek your treasure in heaven, "for where your treasure is, there will be your heart also" (Luke xii. 33).

Therefore be not solicitous. Our Lord deduces a practical conclusion from the principle He has enunciated. To substantiate it, that is, to drive home the necessity of overcoming anxiety in worldly affairs, which simply means detachment, He adduces three arguments. *Is not the life more than the meat?* Surely it follows that God Who gave you the greater will also give you the less; if God gave you life obviously He will give you the means of sustaining life. *Behold the birds of the air.* Our Lord, in His second argument, reverses the process, He now argues from the lesser to the greater. The birds which make no provision for themselves, which of all creatures are the furthest away from food, are fed by God. Will He let you go wanting when, Lord as He is of the creatures He is your Heavenly

Father? And if you *are* solicitous, what can you actually effect *by taking thought*? Can you add to the length of your life (*ἡλικία* designates age as well as *stature*) one single span—a cubit (Cf. Psalm xxxviii. 6).

And for raiment *why are you solicitous*? Just as you must not be unduly anxious for the necessities of existence, neither must you worry for the clothing of your body. Consider the *lilies of the field*, wild flowers, uncared, untended, yet they are clad in beauty, outvying the splendour that amazed the Queen of Sheba (III Kings x. 5). They are but *grass, cast into the oven*, mere plants used for fuel (through deficiency of other combustibles as is still the custom of the East), things of no account. Then if *God doth so clothe them, how much more you*, for whom all visible creation was made, who are in fact the sons of God? (verse 32). *Oh ye of little faith!* In the one breath Our Lord rebukes His hearers for their lack of confidence and urges them, by antithesis, to greater trust in Providence.

Be not therefore solicitous for the means and the amenities of life. Such anxious care brings you down to the level of the *heathens*, who have no true knowledge of, and therefore no trust in, God—surely a shameful thing! There can be no reason for this anxiety since *your Father* (and certainly the Eternal Father) cannot be less provident or benevolent than an earthly father) *knoweth that you have need of all these things*. He has no lack of resources, nor is He circumscribed in action: He is your *Heavenly Father* (Cf. the Greek and verse 26), at once All-good and All-powerful. *Seek ye therefore first the Kingdom of God and His justice*. Here Our Lord voices the obvious and practical conclusion to the whole of His argument. To the prohibition of temporal anxiety and the inculcation of detachment, the Divine Master adds the positive precept as to how the Christian must seek the things of life. He must strive before all else to be a worthy member of Christ's Church on earth so to become worthy of sharing the glory of His Messianic Kingdom. He must work for the righteousness that God wills to be found in him.

The moral is obvious. This conclusion but reiterates in another form the introduction. We must learn to be whole-hearted in the service of God. We must learn, as the Divine Master did Himself in the Lord's Prayer, to put the first things first. For the rest we must abandon ourselves to the Providence of God. This abandonment, however, does not spell sloth. We may seek the second things (I Tim. v. 8; Gen. iii. 17) but in the second place and not with undue solicitude. The things of this world are given for our use; to seek anxiously to amass them is to abuse them. It is to become their slave and not their master, it is to fly in the face of Providence, it is to serve Mammon. We must learn confidence in God and, by inference, detachment, and that applies not merely to the rich but also equally, if not more, to the poor, who by reason of their circumstances are the more likely to be exposed to harassing anxieties.

NOTES ON RECENT WORK

I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

BY THE REV. R. W. MEAGHER, D.D., PH.D., M.A.

"THE time has long passed since Victor Cousin congratulated himself on having discovered on one of those second-hand book-stalls that line the 'quais' of the Seine, the works of a certain Aquinas, who to Victor's great marvel was not lacking either in profundity or originality of thought..." Thus far P. Gillet, now Master-General O.P., in introducing to the world a new pocket-edition of the *Summa Theologica*, which is being brought out under the auspices of the *Editions de la Revue des Jeunes*, and of which Desclée et Cie are the publishers. The intentions of the Editors are to place in the hands of students, cleric and lay, a good French translation of the *Summa*, as well as a sound Latin text; to ensure that the price will be easily within the reach of all; to provide a thoroughly useful set of notes explaining the phraseology of the "Doctor Communis," and, lastly, to compare what the Saint says in the *Summa* with his teaching elsewhere. Let me say at the outset that they have succeeded in their designs, and the various translators and commentators from the Dominican Provinces of Paris, Toulouse and Lyons are to be congratulated on their achievement. May the remaining volumes yet to appear be of the same high standard as that reached by those already produced. The work when completed will comprise more than thirty volumes. To those unacquainted with the format of these little books, this must appear excessive; but there is no need for alarm. Each volume measures $6\frac{3}{4}$ by $4\frac{1}{4}$ inches (small octavo), and the pages vary from 300 to 400 in number; the binding is of stout cloth boards, and its colour depends on the particular part of the *Summa* to which the volume belongs. Thus, for example, the treatises "*De Deo Uno, De Deo Creante, De Anima Humana*," are bound in brown cloth as appertaining to the *Pars Prima*, whilst those "*De Fortitudine, De Vita Humana*," occurring as they do in the *Secunda Secundæ*, rejoice in a royal blue dress. The paper is good and the printing excellent; the price is cheap, about two shillings a volume.¹ The French translation is to be found on the upper half of the page, and the Latin text, in a different type, on the lower. This latter is not that of the Leonine Edition, but belongs to that of the "traditio Parisiensis"; yet the Editors have done their work so well that in reality the divergences from the Leonine are very few and of no account. Emendations are carefully noted, as also MSS variants, though in some volumes

¹ The French price varies from 11 to 12 francs a volume.

(e.g., that on Creation) only one MS has been used (the one numbered 160 in the Bibliothèque Municipale of Laon), and consequently no variants are marked.

The method followed in each volume is the same. First there is a brief introduction by the translator, who is also the commentator, indicating the salient features of the treatise; then follow translation and text, the pages of which are not overburdened with footnotes—a wise proceeding. At the end of the treatise come two appendices: the first of which gives full and useful explanatory notes on the text, often illustrated by quotations from other works of St. Thomas; the second is divided into two sections marked A and B respectively. Section A furnishes technical explanations of a more general nature concerning the doctrines expounded in the treatise, and being the work of a well-known Dominican expert is of great value to Professor, Priest and Student. Section B contains a list of modern books on the subject of the treatise together with the date, author's and publisher's name in each case. Following on this bibliography is a "Table Analytique des Matières," and an index of authors cited either in the text or the notes. Lastly a table of contents closes the volume.

This edition began in 1929 and volumes have since appeared at regular intervals, so that up to the time of writing twenty-two have been published. The translation is excellent always, because the translators have kept before their eyes and observed St. Thomas' own shrewd remarks on this matter: "Ad officium boni translatoris pertinet ut ea quae sunt Catholicae fidei transferens servet sententiam, mutet autem modum loquendi secundum proprietatem linguae in quam transfert" (*Proem. in Opusc. contra Errores Graecorum*). The "*Videtur-quod-non*," consequently, and the reply to it have not been slavishly translated; often indeed, especially in the case of repetition, the translators have been content to give the gist of the difficulty or its answer. Quotations from the Scriptures are all supplied with more exact references than, for example, in the popular Forzani edition. Numbers in thick type and enclosed in brackets are scattered lavishly throughout the French translation and refer the reader to the explanatory notes in the first appendix. To sum up, this edition will be of the greatest advantage to anyone desirous of understanding the *Summa Theologica* and the general principles of the Thomistic system, bearing as it does the hall-mark of the French genius for order, clarity and precision. The moderate price of each volume places the whole series well within the compass of all who read French, and for students, who are not usually blessed with long purses, it has this particular advantage that one may purchase each volume singly without thereby committing himself to the entire collection. In this way one can acquire just those volumes necessary for the year's work either in Dogma or Moral.

Here is a list of volumes that have so far appeared:—Prima

Pars: *Dieu* (3 vols. containing Qq. 1-26), by P. Sertillanges; *La Création* (1 vol. Qq. 44-49), by the same; *L'Ame Humaine* (1 vol. Qq. 75-83), by P. Wébert; *La Pensée Humaine* (1 vol. Qq. 84-89), by the same. Prima Secundæ: *Les Actes Humains* (1 vol. Qq. 6-21), by P. Gillet; *Le Péché* (1 vol. so far, Qq. 71-78), by P. Bernard; *La Grâce* (1 vol. Qq. 109-114), by P. Mulard. Secunda Secundæ: *L'Espérance* (1 vol. Qq. 17-22), by P. Le Tilly; *La Prudence* (1 vol. Qq. 47-56), by P. Noble; *La Force* (1 vol. Qq. 123-140), by P. Folghera; *La Tempérance* (2 vols. Qq. 141-170), by the same; *La Vie Humaine* (1 vol. Qq. 179-189), by P. Lemonnier. Tertia Pars: *Le Verbe Incarné* (2 vols. so far, Qq. 1-15), by P. Hérès; *La Vie de Jésus* (2 vols. so far, Qq. 27-45), by P. Synave; *Le Baptême, La Confirmation* (1 vol. Qq. 66-72), by P. Boulanger. Supplementum: *L'Ordre* (1 vol. Qq. 34-40), by P. Gerlaud; *Le Mariage* (1 vol. so far, Qq. 41-49), by P. Misserey.

It was Callimachus who exclaimed "*μέγα βιβλίον, μέγα κακόν*," but even he would be delighted with these booklets, they are so handy; at last one can take down from one's book-shelf a treatise of the Angelic Doctor and carry it away in one's pocket to read on a train journey as a safe antidote to the effects of lighter stuff! Yet the student who approaches the Summa by means of this edition, must be on his guard against thinking that St. Thomas's masterpiece consists solely of a group of theological treatises. To do so would be to commit a fatal error, for the Summa is a mighty synthesis, a perfect whole, the parts of which are so dove-tailed one into another as to form a continuous development of one magisterial scheme of thought. Of the undoubted value which this edition possesses for Parish-priests and Curates, I may say this: they will find abundant matter in these booklets for sermons and instructions; P. Bernard's long essay entitled "*Reflexions sur la Vraie Nature du Péché*" is an invaluable contribution to the subject of Sin, and the same praise may be given to P. Misserey's careful analysis of St. Thomas's doctrine on the Sacrament of Marriage, as expounded in the Contra Gentes and the Summa Theologica. Padre Bucceroni used to tell his pupils that they ought to read one article every day either from the Prima Secundæ or from the Secunda Secundæ, and this new "pocket Aquinas" should, I think, do much towards rescuing from neglect the moral treatises of St. Thomas, which, in my experience at any rate, are the least known parts of the Summa among students. But I am going outside my province. The reader will, however, be able to form some idea of the worth of the commentaries on the strictly dogmatic treatises from the titles of the following excursus or essays. Thus P. Sertillanges in the three volumes "*De Deo Uno*" writes on the Divisions of Being, the Argument of St. Anselm, the Quinque Viae, Evil, Pantheism, Time and Eternity, the Infinite, Analogy, God's Knowledge, His Free-Will, Providence, Predestination, the Number of the Elect, etc. Some of these essays have the length of review articles, and

coming from the pen of so able a master they well repay the time spent in pondering over them. P. Synave, in his commentary on Qq. 27-45 of the *Tertia Pars*, discourses fully on such subjects as the Name Mary, St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception, Mary Mother of Divine Grace, St. Joseph, the Name Jesus, Mary the Θεοτόκος, the Childhood of Jesus, St. John the Baptist, Christ's Miracles, etc. The essay on St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception is soundly historical and points out how at the very end of his life Aquinas was as firmly opposed to the doctrine as at the beginning of his theological career; how in no wise did he differ on this point from the teaching of his master, Albert, or from that of many of his great contemporaries.

One of the most recent and most attractive of the volumes is that edited and commented on by P. Mulard. Considering the amount of ink spilled over the subject of Grace, it comes somewhat as a shock to find how small is that treatise of St. Thomas, when isolated in its solitary grandeur. Luther, Calvin, Baius and Jansenius had not yet appeared; yet even as early as 1270 the two main Protestant doctrines on Grace are anticipated and refuted (Q. 110, art. 1). I recommend especially P. Mulard's "Notes Doctrinales Thomistes" to anyone who desires to understand the Thomistic principles (Bannesian? Shades of John Capreolus, *Thomistarum Princeps!*) of Human Liberty and Grace. I do not recollect ever having met such a concise yet accurate synthesis before, even in the works of Dummermuth or Del Prado. The essay on Sanctifying Grace is obviously the result of much profound thinking. Whether one agrees with him or not on disputed points, it must be admitted that he has stated his position firmly yet courteously, and always with clarity, and so I have no hesitation in recommending his little book to the perplexed and to those ignorant of the views of the great theological school for which he stands.

II. PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE REV. M. C. D'ARCY, S.J.

MANY of the more recent books on philosophy have been reviewed separately in these pages, and from the number which remain I shall have to make a somewhat arbitrary selection. They fall into certain natural divisions. Much, for instance, has been written on the relations of philosophy and science and the significance of recent physical discoveries. I omit such works as they cannot be discussed in short, and generally they take us beyond the region of philosophy. Amongst them Whitehead deserves the most attention from Catholic philosophical thinkers, and for light on his very involved theories articles by Professor A. E. Taylor scattered about various periodicals can be consulted with profit. If Taylor be right—and I have heard Whitehead admit the imputation—this reconstruction of modern natural philosophy bears a close resemblance to that of Plato, and in Taylor's monumental edition of the *Timaeus* many parallels are drawn.

Second only to the problems of physical science are those which are exercising philosophers in biology. The most radical and materialistic interpretation is to be found in the theory of Behaviourism, a view which originated in America and still finds favour there. For a time it attracted English writers, and its influence can be seen in some of the works of Bertrand Russell and in the Gifford lectures of Professor Alexander. Quite recently a book called, *The Nature of Living Matter*, by L. Hogben, has been brought out, in which all that can be said for the mechanistic hypothesis and all that needs answering can be found. An anti-mechanistic view has for a long time found in Professor J. S. Haldane a defender, and his Gifford lectures sum up the thought of a lifetime. Unfortunately he stops short at a theism which does no justice to many of the attributes of God and definitely excludes Christianity. Despite these very serious limitations, however, the writer cannot fail to win respect, and many of the points he makes will be useful to the Catholic scholar. Not a biologist, but one whose views, as a psychologist, conflict with many of the dogmas of the materialists and writers on biology, Professor McDougall has written in his *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution* a valuable criticism of many of the current theories. When he touches on the nature of the soul and freedom he is himself very shaky and less convincing than he used to be, but readers who wish to know something about Emergent Evolution and the Gestalt school in Germany will find clear accounts of them in this book, and able criticism of them as well. The former theory has been developed in many books by its principal exponent, Lloyd Morgan. Emergent Evolution, as its name suggests, is an attempt to keep that continuity in nature which belongs to evolution and to admit as well constant novelty. The novelty is conveyed by the word emergent; organizations as they develop, show new qualities and properties which were not discoverable in the pre-existing systems, and nevertheless these new qualities are intrinsic to the system; they therefore emerge, and emergence becomes a law of nature. The difficulties, to use a mild expression, of this explanation are well brought out by McDougall, and he maintains that there is no escape from these difficulties save by a return to teleology.

Of works on psychology that by the Catholic writer, Rudolf Allers, the reader in Psychiatry at the University of Vienna, called *The Psychology of Character*, is reviewed in another place. Amongst English publications the most noteworthy are *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, by G. F. Stout, and, perhaps, *Creative Mind*, by C. Spearman. The latter is a small book but interesting for those who esteemed his *Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition*. Stout's work is well known and this latest work ranks with his best. He still remains faithful in his method and general outlook to his master James Ward and he has not succumbed to the fascination of the chief tenets of what is called the modern psychology. Like Ward, however,

he has no finished and satisfactory solution to the problem of knowledge and the terms of his psychology still leave themselves open to the severe attacks made upon them some years ago by Mr. Joseph in *Mind*.

So far I have been giving little more than a list of names and books. I must now treat at greater length some recent books on Ethics. For the last few years English philosophers have concentrated their attention on this subject, and on one particular problem in it, namely the relation of the right to the good. The problem has its origin in the Kantian theory, but the full significance of it has not come to the fore till recently. At Cambridge Dr. Moore, who always worries a question until it is in pieces, set his teeth into that of the right and the good in two well-known books. Independently of Dr. Moore, Mr. Prichard at Oxford tackled the same question. Professor Prichard, as he now is, was a disciple of Cook Wilson, probably the most acute philosopher of his time in England, and whatever he writes is sure to be thorough, if not always sympathetic. His conclusions were published in an article in *Mind*, 1912. In the intervening years he has not changed his opinions. So far from doing so he and Dr. Moore have won a number to their various opinions, so that it is usual to find now in discussions of Ethics the question of an ultimate good treated lightly or disparagingly and attention focussed on the notion of duty. To show the revival of ethical study I need but mention the fact that within the last two years we have had a short book by Mr. Carritt, *The Theory of Morals*, *The Right and the Good*, by Mr. Ross, the Provost of Oriel, *Some Problems in Ethics*, by Mr. Joseph, *Morals and Western Religion*, by Professor Laird, *The Good Will*, by Mr. Paton, and *The Faith of a Moralist*, by Professor A. E. Taylor. Besides these I should add a reprint of Bradley's *Ethical Studies* and the inaugural lecture of Professor Prichard.

The two volumes of Taylor fall outside the dispute. They have received a special review so that I need only say this, that they have claims to be regarded as the finest work on moral philosophy in the English language. I should not hesitate to affirm this categorically were it not that they suffer from the foibles and occasional contrariness of the author. It is a pleasure all the same to be able to compliment an English writer, in the first rank as a scholar and teacher of philosophy, on a vindication of Christian morality and almost Catholic ideals. Mr. Paton's book, too, must be put apart, though not for the same reasons. He proves that the English Hegelian tradition is by no means moribund. It has indeed been superseded in men's minds by the various forms of realism which emanate from Cambridge and America and were taught for a long time unobtrusively at Oxford, but Bradley and Bosanquet still live in their disciples. Readers will know the type of thought to be found in this mitigated Hegelian idealism, reliance on coherence as the criterion of truth, a defence of the general will and the absolute good articulated in its parts and members, and much talk of the Whole and of the Mind and of organic unity.

For the chief concern of contemporary moral philosophers we cannot do better than turn to the inaugural lecture of Professor Prichard or the comments on it by Mr. Joseph in his book. Prichard says that philosophers have made a mistake in trying to justify their reasons for doing what they ought to do by bringing them under the good. Such an attempt is as impossible as to give a theory of knowledge which will explain to us that we know when we are knowing; it is in fact a false problem, for just as knowing must be ultimate and its own justification, so the rightness of an action is the complete rational reason why we do it. Moreover, it is quite impossible to start with the notion of the good and to get moral obligation out of it unless we already know and appreciate what rightness is. If you say that we may know vaguely what rightness is, but that the good gives its foundation and final justification, it is easy to show that this cannot be the case, for first it implies that the right does not appeal to us as rational; secondly, we cannot see why we ought to aim at the final good unless the "ought" is already evident; thirdly, we cannot have it both ways, an intrinsic rightness and a rightness which depends on the nature of the good to be appreciated; and lastly, in our choices we cannot do an action at the same time because it is right and because it is good for me or for the world.

In this summary I have not done justice to the closeness and severity of Prichard's argument. So cogent has it appeared to those who have read it that they have either succumbed to its reasoning, or shown themselves unable to give an adequate answer. Thus Mr. Carritt in his excellent little work says: "the truth appears to be that the rightness of an act cannot be deduced, as all the preceding theories assumed, from the 'goodness' of the result, whether achieved or aimed at. None of these theories escaped the false distinction of means and end. Nearly all moralists since Plato have attempted, and none of them with success, to prove that certain acts are right, either the acts commonly thought right in their day or some slightly amended code of their own. And this they have tried to do by deducing the act from the conception of a good or end which it is to achieve. But there is no such proof of moral judgments." Hence, after having given a very penetrating criticism of the old theories, such as pleasure and utilitarianism, he decides that the *Summum Bonum*, too, is of no avail. "The *Summum Bonum* has, I believe, been the *ignis fatuus* of moral philosophy. It is sometimes a blanket term to cover everything which has any value, as when we say that a life perfect in righteousness and in the enjoyment of happiness, truth and beauty would be the Good. This is the sense in which Kant speaks of the *summum bonum* or *bonum consummatum* as an externally effected union of duty with satisfaction, and in which Aristotle often speaks of *Eudaimonia*. Sometimes it means what we ought to choose, or the good which most concerns us as moral creatures, and this is plainly morality, which alone is always obligatory and always in our power. This is the sense in which Aristotle also often

speaks of Eudaimonia, and in which Kant says that nothing has unconditional worth but the good will (*bonum supremum*). But to ask whether happiness or morality is '*the good*' conveys to me no clear meaning." Mr. Ross expresses the same doctrine in another way which is peculiar to himself. "The morally good cannot be described so simply as the morally indifferent or the morally bad. For it contains two different kinds; between which there is yet a certain similarity. Action from the sense of duty stands out from all other action that can be called morally good. In the latter our desire, precisely, is to produce something thought of as good—say, the pleasure of another, or one's own advance in virtue or in intelligence. In the former our desire, precisely, is to do that which is right. And between the desire to produce something that is good and the desire to do something that is right there is a difference of kind. It is only action of the former kind that is thoroughly rational."

I hope I have said enough to give a correct impression of the problem and the line of answer which approves itself to many. As can be seen, the theory of Kant has originated the problem, but it is a Kant changed and corrected which suggests the answer, so that it would be a grave mistake to think that a refutation of Kant sufficed to meet the present view. After inclining to it for many years Mr. Joseph has revolted, and his authority in philosophy is so high that he is likely to lead many others to follow him. "It is," as he says, "this difficulty, how to reconcile the conviction that the obligation to do an action does not arise merely from the goodness of some results or consequences of the action, with the conviction that the action that I recognize I ought to do cannot be without value in itself: how to maintain that obligation is neither derived from the goodness merely of the consequences of the action to which I am obliged, not yet independent of relation to any goodness, that will be seen to provoke most of what attempts to be constructive in the present discussions."

The argument is of considerable interest if only because of its resemblance to and difference from that of Catholic writers. I cannot summarize it as in the original it reads like the summary of a lecture, but the conclusion in his own words is: "that there is a rightness in right actions distinguishable from our obligation to do them, though the latter is sometimes meant by calling them right. This rightness is a form of goodness, to the realizing of which the actions belong; and it is the thought of this goodness which moves us when we do an action from a sense of obligation. Further, though the goodness of right actions may differ from one another, as they do from those of goods which are not actions, we can yet see a certain common principle of structure in different goods; and in systems of this structure, the goodness of the parts, which may be particular right actions, is not independent of that of the system to which they belong." It will be noticed that the argument here becomes vague just where in Catholic thought it is most definite.

One other point worth noticing before we leave this subject of Ethics is that discussion now has settled on questions on which we have much common ground. One has only to consult the history of Ethics to be aware that time and time again philosophers have talked a language so alien from that of Scholasticism as to make discussion purely polemical. For the present they are content to accept notions like right and duty and goodness and freedom and to seek to determine their meaning and relation.

Amongst other recent books a study of *Locke, Berkeley, Hume*, by C. R. Morris, and Miss Susan Stebbing's *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, are worth mention, especially the latter because of its clear exposition of a new branch of philosophy which is very difficult to understand. A great change has taken place in Logic, and if the exponents of it are right the old treatises have become definitely out of date. Both at home and abroad the new conceptions in mathematics have been introduced into logic, and the home of this movement in England has been Cambridge. The *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead has influenced many logicians, and nowadays one cannot pick up a number of *Mind* or the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* without coming across an article which is so full of mathematical symbols as to be caviare to the general. Mr. Johnstone of Cambridge produced a three volume Logic in which the new ideas were incorporated, and now Miss Stebbing, who was a pupil of Russell and Moore has given us a clear idea of the intentions and significance of this mathematical logic and of the symbols employed. What becomes more and more evident in reading Miss Stebbing is that this new Logic is through and through Nominalist. It is supposed to be based on a realist philosophy, but this realism is of that variety which starts with sense data and distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The latter covers the intellectual content of knowledge, and the term used, description, serves to show its nominalist character and explains why the word symbol plays such a large part in this logic. For this reason, despite the claims made for it by its authors, I do not think that it will in the end add much to the traditional logic based on Aristotle.

I must now turn to Catholic writings. We are still very much dependent on foreign books, and Sheed and Ward have deserved well of us by making available in English translations many of the best books which have been produced abroad. Von Hildebrand is a professor at the University of Munich; he has done much to bring Catholic thought to the fore in Germany and it is only fitting that we should be made acquainted with his work. As a beginning his *In Defence of Purity* has been chosen, and it is a good choice as it is not too difficult and is at the same time a noble statement of Catholic ideals. Another German writer, hitherto unknown, I suspect, in England, Peter Wust, has been introduced to us in a small book called *The Crisis in the West*, and it contains an interesting account of his life and thought

by Mr. Watkin. Both of these thinkers are laymen; the one is a convert and the other a born Catholic, who after a period of unbelief has returned to the faith. Neither has been trained in the strict scholastic tradition, and this fact gives freshness to their attitude without interfering with its orthodoxy. The same can be said of M. Chevalier's *Pascal*. This work, like all that Chevalier writes, is excellent, and should be read alongside P. Auguste Valensin's *A la Suite de Pascal*.

Many of M. Maritain's books have been translated. *The Things that are not Cæsar's*, gives a lucid explanation of the principles which govern the relation of Church and State. *An Introduction to Philosophy* will prove very helpful to those who without former training wish to acquire some knowledge of Catholic philosophy, or perhaps I ought to say Thomism, as Maritain is the sworn champion of all things Thomistic. His last book to be translated is called *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, a title which is not very happy as it does not tell us in what way his subject is going to be treated, and there are several other books already in English with similar titles. The contents, however, do not clash with or repeat what has been said by others. There is no mistaking the vogue which the Thomist philosophy is now enjoying. Book after book is being written or translated, and I own that when I opened the pages of this new one I had the fear that it was being overdone and that a reaction might easily set in. The first pages only increased my fears as Maritain sets down in his own fervent way stories about St. Thomas which remind one of the old, uncritical lives of the saints. This fear gradually passed away after the first chapter had been finished, for Maritain is at his best when he comes to write of the glories of the Christian philosophy and its importance in European culture and for the spiritual life of individuals. It remains true nevertheless that this is primarily a book for Catholics and should be recommended with caution to those outside the faith.

I have said that books on St. Thomas are being poured out. P. Sertillanges has just written a life for the series of *Les Grands Coeurs*; and in the *Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, and *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litterature du Moyen Age*, both under the editorship of the indefatigable M. Gilson, studies of great value continue to appear. Amongst these I recommend especially Gilson's *Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin*, and *La Structure Metaphysique du Concret selon Saint Thomas*, by Aimé Forest. The only work in English comparable to that of Gilson's is that by Miss Dorothy Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century*, with which she won her doctorate at Oxford.

I have been forced to make only a selection of recent books on philosophy which may represent what are the main currents. I should like to have said something about two theses presented for the Doctorate of the Sorbonne by P. Siwek, S.J. One is entitled *La Psychophysique humaine d'après Aristote*, and the

other *L'Ame et le Corps d'après Spinoza*. They have both been added to the *Collection Historique des Grands Philosophes* and are very good examples of scientific criticism based on the principles of Scholasticism. Other works of merit are to be found in the *Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie*, and for one who wishes to keep in touch with modern philosophical literature and the discussions and controversies in the Schools I cannot recommend any better work of reference than these *Archives*.

III. SCIENCE.

BY THE REV. G. A. ELRINGTON, O.P., D.Sc.

"EXPERIMENTAL science has three great prerogatives (or dignities) over other great sciences; it verifies conclusions by direct experiment; it discovers truth which they never otherwise would reach; it investigates the course of nature and opens to us a knowledge of the past and of the future." Thus wrote Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century. His words are as true to-day as when he first uttered them and they are applicable to that branch of science namely experimental psychology which is gaining more importance daily, both for its scientific interest and practical applications.

In the schools Psychology is treated as a branch of metaphysics, *De Anima*, the science of the soul; and although this science has its roots in empirical observation, yet in its method it differs vastly from experimental Psychology.

If we look outside the Schools and Scholastic teaching and enquire into the meaning which the word psychology has acquired of late years, we encounter something very different, something which to the Scholastic does not seem to be psychology in his sense at all, but a farrago of facts and theories which appear relatively unimportant. Nevertheless the experimentalist and the philosopher are dealing with the same data. Each alike treats of such processes as thought, feelings and emotions, sensations, perception, volition, and so on, but in different ways and by different methods. Philosophy endeavours to plumb the depths and reach to ultimate causes. Science confines itself to the phenomena given to our experience and seeks to bring them into relation with other phenomena.

The philosophical and experimental method in psychology has each its own value and its own peculiar limitations and they are complementary to each other.

If experimental psychology has acquired a *relatively* greater value to-day it is owing mainly to its practical applications to the activities of human beings in their different and successive phases.

Every child born is born into a certain environment and has a goal before it in life, and for this its innate powers or faculties need to be educated so that it may eventually take up an adequate well adapted position in the world; but failures are

frequent and these can often be traced to the faulty understanding of the child's capacities and reactions. Psychology here steps in to help. As it is with the child, so it is in another way with the adolescent and the adult; each is an organism which in some way or other has to fit into his environment and become a socialized human being. An individual's reactions to his environment, his behaviour in short, is the outcome partly of his innate temperamental constitution, partly the direct or indirect result of his reaction or response to his changing environment.

Experimental psychology to-day is chiefly concerned with that part of human experience which is briefly termed behaviour. But this has not always been its aim; so we must for a moment turn back and look at psychology retrospectively.

Experimental psychology in a strict sense dates from the establishment of a psychological laboratory at Leipzig by Wilhelm Wundt in 1875. Since then psychological laboratories have increased and multiplied, apparatus and technique have become more and more elaborate and perfect, as the problems or tasks set for experimental investigation became more abundant and more complicated. Previously to this date isolated experiments of a quasi-psychological nature had been made, but so far there was no attempt at turning psychology into a separate branch of experimental science.

From Descartes in the seventeenth to Wundt in the nineteenth century psychology was mainly empirical, interspersed with some experimentation. Hence we can speak of a pre-experimental empirical psychology, distinct in its methods and outlook from philosophy, yet not exactly scientific in the modern sense of this word.

The reader interested in the history of this subject may profitably consult the excellent work of Mr. Gardner Murphy "An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology" (Kegan Paul & Co.) in which the whole psychological movement from its beginning to the present day is fully and lucidly described.

We are more concerned in the present paper with the conception of Psychology as an experimental science, distinct on the one hand from philosophy and on the other from biology, physiology or the physical sciences.

Phenomena, events, are as we know the immediate data for experimental science, and experimentation in a rigorous and exact form is one method of investigating such phenomena.

In science such as Physics great emphasis is laid on accurate experimentation, and in the beginning psychology tended to adopt this method seeking to establish relations between the subjective states and processes of our inner consciousness with external physical or physiological events.

From this arose the classical treatises such as that of Fechner—The Elements of Psycho-physics—or of Wundt on Psycho-Physiology, and others. The next step lies in the

introduction of a carefully controlled method of introspection in which the subject of a psychological experiment looks, as it were, into his mind and endeavours to recall as accurately as possible such states and experiences as appear in his consciousness during the period of the experiment.

Great importance was attached to this introspective analysis of conscious processes and their relation to the stimulus or situation which evoked them. The subject of the experiment was in all cases called upon to make a "report" of his findings; these were controlled by comparison with similar experiments carried out with other subjects. The method was scientific in its outlook and procedure and was applied to the various mental processes, as sensations, perception, memory, attention, judging, willing, choosing, and so on. It was, of course, mainly descriptive, and its aim was the discovery of the elements of conscious processes and their fusion or compounding with the complex states or processes of mind.

In this way a new kind of psychology was gradually built up to which the term "Structuralism" or "Existentialism" has been given to distinguish it from the later development of experimental psychology in which the emphasis is placed on process or function rather than on "elements" or contents of mind. This later development which has assumed various forms has been called Functionalism.

The Psychology of the present day has, in the main, adopted the functionalist point of view or attitude out of which has arisen the various applied psychologies educational, industrial, medical, vocational, and the rest.

This more recent development has brought about an increase of interest in psychology and added considerably to its value at the expense perhaps of scientific accuracy. Hence the discord between the adherents of the older structuralist school, and the partisans of "behaviourism" by which the new movement is often characterized. Hence also arises the present-day difficulty of formulating a definition of Psychology which shall cover all its aspects.

We cannot dwell further here over this controversy, it is all set forth very fully in two volumes, entitled "Psychologies of 1925 and 1930," published by the Clark University, Massachusetts (25s. and 30s., obtainable from Oxford University Press).

Irreconcilable as the views expressed seem to be, there is an underlying unity which is fundamental inasmuch as all branches of experimental psychology "are adequately defined in a general way by their method, that of direct observation, and by their problems, the description of the facts and discovery of laws," as Mr. John Paul Nafe writes in his contribution to the volume "Psychologies of 1930."

The dividing differences concern particular problems and methods rather than fundamental ones. All alike may lay claim

to the somewhat ambiguous title of "Psychologist," even though some among the stricter adherents of the traditional experimental psychology, inaugurated by Wundt and typically illustrated in later years by Edward Titchener, claim to reserve the name psychology for their more strictly experimental science, dubbing the rest "Behaviourism," or even inventing a new term, as Anthroponomy.²

An excellent summary of psychological research will be found in Professor Henri Pieron's "Principles of Experimental Psychology" (International Library of Psychology. Kegan Paul, 10s. 6d.), which is a very useful introduction to the whole subject. The author, in common with many psychologists to-day, treats experimental psychology as a branch of biology. "It sets forth," he writes, "the principles generally stated in connection with the scientific study of the mental functions of living beings, having more especially to do with normal civilized man, who interests us in practical life." (Preface, p. viii.)

In treating psychology as a branch of biology we get a more fruitful standpoint, for instead of concentrating research on mental processes, the organism and its reactions becomes the focus of investigation. Man is treated as a whole, as a mind-body structure; living and adapting himself to his surroundings. Account, therefore, has to be taken of the inner aspect and forces of his life, the instincts, emotions, impulses, intelligence, will, social influences, and so on. There is indeed scarcely any department or aspect of human activity that does not afford matter for psychological study, for beyond the immediate practical concerns of life, art, music, literature, religious experiences are all suffused with psychological meaning and interest.

With this extended application of the term psychology we may be asked a question as to the meaning of the term "experimental." We may, as a matter of convenience rather than of strict accuracy, call the whole of this kind of psychology experimental to distinguish it from its philosophical neighbours.

A part of such experimental psychology as we are here attempting to describe is carried out with the aid of apparatus the varieties of which are specially designed according to the kind of psychological or psycho-physical problem to be investigated. We might call this "apparatus-experimental-psychology," were it not rather a clumsy expression.

By way of illustration we may mention the "Reaction Time" experiment in which the subject of the experiment is called upon to react by some prescribed movement as rapidly as possible to a sound or light or some other sensory stimulus. The time elapsing between the perception of the stimulus and the execution of the reaction is registered by a "time-marker."

² Walter S. Hunter, "Anthroponomy and Psychology," in *Psychologies of 1930*.

The Reaction times of individuals vary, and among the conditions which bring about differences in their performance are certain psychological phenomena. It is, therefore, a psychological experiment. The results obtained by this experiment may further be compared with data derived from other experiments or with reports furnished by the observer practising "introspection" or observing his own inner mental processes during the course of the experiment. The experiment has a wide practical application to certain practical callings in life. This is, of course, merely one example out of many to illustrate the meaning of experimental (apparatus) psychology.

But there is yet a wider field of psychology to which the term "experimental" in this sense is less applicable, since apparatus and experiment may not be involved. Such, for example, is that branch of psychology which investigates human behaviour or conduct, and in which instincts, feelings, emotions, "complexes" and so on play a large part. This like experimental psychology is based on observation, it seeks for facts of mental experience but its method of approach is analytical and descriptive rather than experimental in the strict sense. The term "empirical" or interpretative psychology might be more applicable than experimental. Yet for economy it is in the end preferable to keep to the term experimental and extend its signification so as to cover all psychology which rests upon observation and the bringing of the phenomena discovered under some general law or into the field of some adequate explanatory hypothesis.

The reader acquainted with the writings of Freud, Jung, Adler and more recently of Rudolf Allers,³ will see how small is the part which actual experimentation plays therein compared with observation, analysis, and interpretation. It is in the end a question of the difference in the problems under investigation, and in consequence a difference in the method of approach.

This lack of scientific experimental verification or control of the conclusions reached by analytical psychologists is sometimes turned into a reproach against its scientific value.

As Mr. J. C. Flugel⁴ remarks: "In the paucity of attempts at objective control along these lines (i.e., referring to certain association experiments of Jung) we may see a regrettable consequence of the dissociation between psycho-analysis and experimental psychology. Most psychologists, being primarily therapists, were little interested in the niceties of experimental control which are here in question. It is greatly to be hoped that a *rapprochement* between analysts and experimentalists will, in the near future, lead to a fruitful co-operation in this field."

³ *The Psychology of Character*, Engl. Transl. by Dr. E. B. Strauss, 1931.

⁴ *Psychologies of 1930*.

It is quite true as this writer also remarks that psycho-analysis and behaviourism constitute one of the greatest recent departures from the general method of experimental psychology. But new problems require new methods and all may be included in the general and wider conception of experimental psychology which we have suggested, if we keep in mind the particular differences, problems and methods.

In conclusion we should like to point out that the value of experimental psychology lies in the first place in its scientific character. Like all science it begins with disinterested investigation, the immediate aim of which is discovery. Out of this there arises a further value in so far as the results of its investigation are found to have some practical application to life's problems.

Hence the wide fields of educational, industrial, commercial, medical and even legal psychology which represent further developments, all of which are indebted in some way or other to work done previously by the experimentalists to which we may now add a further indebtedness to the various analytical schools of psychology.

The problems presented to the psychologist to-day are so many and so varied that a considerable differentiation both in approach and method was inevitable. We cannot expect to obtain absolute uniformity of opinion in the interpretation of phenomena, yet the motive and end remain fundamentally the same, namely the experimental exploration of mental activity which is sufficient to justify the title of experimental psychology, the practical value of which lies in the fertility of its applications to the complicated art of living.

ROMAN DOCUMENTS

BY THE REV. A. BENTLEY, Ph.D., M.A.

CIRCA INDULGENTIAS VIAE CRUCIS AB INFIRMIS LUCRANDAS.

Devotam Passionis SS. D.N.I.C. recordationem per pium, quod vocant, exercitium *Viae Crucis* maximi infirmis esse solaminis, qui spirituali eorum adsistentiae dant operam unanimiter testificantur. Ad excitandos igitur ad tam salutarem praxim eos quoque qui a praefato pio exercitio regulariter peragendo aegritudine impediuntur, SS. D.N. Pius Pp. XI, instante infrascripto Cardinali Maiori Poenitentiario, in audientia diei 20 currentis mensis, benigne concedere dignatus est ut infirmi qui pium exercitium *Viae Crucis* nec in forma ordinaria nec in forma statuta a Clemente XIV die 26 Ianuarii 1773, per recitationem scilicet viginti *Pater, Ave et Gloria*, absque gravi incommodo vel difficultate peragere valeant, omnes et singulas indulgentias, eidem pio exercitio quomodocunque adnexas, lucrari possint vel osculando vel etiam tantum intuendo, cum affectu et animo contrito, in aliquem Crucifixum ad hoc benedictum, eis vel a sacerdote vel ab aliqua alia persona exhibitum, et recitando brevem aliquam orationem vel precem iaculatoriam in memoriam Passionis et mortis I.C.D.N. Praesentibus absque Brevis expeditione in perpetuum valituris, contrariis quibuscunque non obstantibus. Datum Romae, ex Sacra Poenitentiaria, die 25 Martii 1931.

Therefore those of the sick whom serious inconvenience or difficulty prevents from making the Stations of the Cross after the manner permitted by Clement XIV, may now gain all the indulgences, provided that they kiss or even gaze upon, with love and contrition, a crucifix blessed for the purpose, and say a prayer or ejaculation in memory of the Passion and Death of Our Lord. The decree is silent about the faculty presumably required for blessing the crucifix. (A.A.S. XXIII, p. 167.)

ECCLESIASTICAL INSPECTION OF SEMINARIES.

By *Motu Proprio* of April 24th, 1931, the Holy Father has established a new ecclesiastical office—that of *Visitor Ordinarius* to the seminaries of Italy. The Visitor will take his place in the S.C. of Seminaries and Studies next in rank to the Secretary of the Congregation. It will be his duty to inspect in particular—at least once a year—the regional or interdiocesan seminaries which are closely dependent upon the Holy See.

In parenthesis, the *Motu Proprio* hints at the eventual extension of the Visitor's powers beyond the boundaries of Italy. (A.A.S. XXIII, p. 151.)

CANDIDATES FOR ORDINATION.

A review of each candidate's character and qualifications is

obviously a normal preliminary to any ordination. Now, however, such an examination must follow a fixed method, imposed by a new Instruction of the S.C. of the Sacraments, dated December 27th, 1930.

The aim is twofold. First, it is necessary to place beyond all doubt the reasonableness of the step which the candidate is taking—his entire freedom and his thorough grasp of the nature of the obligations which he is assuming. Secondly, the candidate's fitness must be shown by collating the evidence of the Rector and other officials of the seminary *with that of the candidate's parish priest*, and of any other suitable witnesses, ecclesiastic or lay. Personal interviews between each aspirant and the Ordinary or his delegate should complete the scrutiny.

The most exhaustive enquiry must precede tonsure and minor orders. But this scrutiny is not final: it must be revised or supplemented before each of the three major orders after the manner laid down in the Instruction. The two essentials—the liberty and suitability of the subject—must be proved afresh *at each stage*.

A candidate for tonsure and minor orders will in future make his petition in writing at least two months before the date of the ordinations. The petition, written and signed by himself, will declare his right intention and free choice. Thereupon the Ordinary should commission the Rector of the seminary to make all necessary investigations: afterwards he should interview separately the Rector and Vice-Rector. The reports of parish priests and others must be drawn up on the lines of the interrogatories supplied in an Appendix to the decree. The same Appendix gives the text of an oath to be taken before each of the three major orders.

Approving the decree, the Holy Father prescribed that it should be read to the seminarists at the beginning of each scholastic year. Finally, in reporting on the state of their dioceses, Ordinaries should not omit to mention the fulfilment of the provisions of the decree. (A.A.S. XXIII, p. 120.)

CATHOLIC ACTION.

The Pope's letter to Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan, deploring the recent attack made on Catholic Action in Italy, was published in the *Acta* of May 4th. The Holy Father's intervention was provoked, and rendered unavoidable, by a speech of Signor Giuriati, who, in denouncing the policy of Catholic Action, was clearly attacking the Holy See. It is common knowledge that Catholic Action is directed by the Holy Father and the hierarchy, and the Pope was, even chronologically, the first of those "who appeal to a paragraph of the Concordat" (*i.e.*, to Art. 43).

The proper and competent authority in religious matters is the Church; but the State is bound to favour the teaching *and the practice* of religion. Such an end is not attained "by exposing youth to ideals of hatred and irreverence; by

making the practice of religious duties difficult or even impossible through contemporaneous exercises of an entirely different character; by allowing public contests of feminine athletics, such as even paganism recognised as unsuitable or dangerous."

The Holy Father has no difficulty in showing how preposterous it would be to claim for the State a full control over all the citizens in their individual, domestic, spiritual, supernatural life. In the spiritual sphere the Church is supreme, and she has consistently declared Catholic Action to be a part of normal supernatural life, aiming first at a more and more perfect spiritual formation, and secondly at a more effective and wider lay apostolate. From the first days of Christianity, the Church has always taken for granted the vital necessity and the lawfulness of Catholic Action.

Catholic Action does not meddle with politics. On this point, the Holy See has been faithfully obeyed. The very rare exceptions, hardly ever intentional, have been unhesitatingly reproofed and corrected; and it is, therefore, unfair to base any generalization upon such cases. On the other hand, Catholic Action does not, and cannot, prevent individuals from exercising political influence in a Christian and Catholic manner: it serves as an excellent preparation for such work.

Nor need there be any conflict between Catholic Action and the civil organization of labour. The latter is concerned with the natural order. The Church has the right to organize for religious ends, and her interests inevitably touch problems which are not merely material, but largely moral, with moral consequences for the individual, the family and society in general. She cannot be indifferent to such aspects of labour and social problems as involve the honour of God and the good of souls. The sanctification of labour, a nobler conscientiousness, patience' aid, so sorely needed by the lowly and the suffering, brotherly love and Christian justice, surer protection for threatened virtue—clearly these are not the least important elements in such problems. Goodwill is called for here, so that any *rencontre* along these lines may only result in closer co-operation for the greater good.

Catholic Action is a help, not a hindrance, to the State in its relation to individuals and to social classes. But what of the fascist State? On this head, the Holy Father is content to point out that fascism calls itself, and wishes to be, Catholic. The only way to fulfil that ideal is by obedience to the Church and to its Head. On the question of Catholic Action the will of the Church has never been doubtful; but at no time has it been so manifest as in our own days. (A.A.S. XXIII, p. 145.)

REVIEW OF REVIEWS

THE MONTH, May, 1931. In a second article on *Father Persons, S.J., and the Seminaries in Spain*, Father Leo Hicks develops his idyllic picture of Father Persons' relations with Douay. After the arrival of the great Jesuit in Spain, early in 1589, one of his first acts was to obtain a grant of 3,000 ducats for Douay from Philip II. Father Hicks also shows that in 1589-1590 the position of the English College, whether at Douay or Rheims, was a precarious one, and that this "undoubtedly had its weight with Persons in his decision to found a new seminary in Catholic Spain, where, if disaster should befall the institution in France, the students might find a secure refuge, be able to continue their studies in peace, and thus maintain the supply of priests so necessary for the continuance of the Faith in England." The picture is a charming one; Father Persons appears as the Fairy Godmother of the secular clergy—finding money for their College at Douay and preparing a secure refuge for the seculars in Spain, if disaster should befall them in France. One hardly wonders at Father Hicks' denunciation, in a previous article, of the ingratitude shown towards Father Persons by a section of the secular clergy, viz., by the Appellant Priests. "They could," he complains, "scarcely allow anything good to be the result of Persons' labours." Their attitude certainly seems to need explanation—an explanation which Father Hicks obligingly supplies. It appears that the Appellant Priests were involved "in a dangerous alliance with enemies of the Faith." Their writings, so Father Hicks informs us, defended the anti-Catholic policy and even the persecution of Elizabeth's government. Their opposition to Persons was, therefore, quite natural. Persons, as is well known, was an intrepid defender of the Faith; the Appellant Priests were apparently rather hostile to it. Evidently, they had to fight Persons.

This explanation has the merit of being clear and simple. Nevertheless, those students who happen to know something of the Appellant Priests are hardly likely to be completely satisfied by an explanation so fatal to their honour. There is another explanation which Father Hicks might find worth considering. Without in any way denying Father Persons' many services to Douay, the question may be raised as to whether those services were entirely disinterested. It sometimes happens that services are rendered at a price. The Scots' College at Douay was also assisted by Father Persons and other Jesuits in a very generous way; but, note the sequel: "for this reason, the Jesuits afterwards claimed the property as their own, although it was admitted that in its early years secular clergy had been educated there." (See Catholic Encyclopædia article on Douai.) Hence, even admitting Persons' services to the

English College at Douai in the fullest possible way, the question still remains as to what price, if any, he set upon those services. Supposing that price to have been excessive, the hostility of the Appellant Priests to Father Persons needs no further explanation. One hopes that Father Hicks, in his later articles, will give some consideration to this aspect of the question. As yet he has not done so. His blindness to it is all the more remarkable as it is just the aspect which is stressed by the ablest defenders of the Appellant Priests. Their case does not consist in a denial of Father Persons' services, but rather in the claim that he gave those services at too great a price. As an example, one might quote Dodd's *The Secret Policy of the English Society of Jesus*, pp. 57 and 58: "Now if upon other occasions afterwards, Father Persons ever was the Man, who used his Interest to benefit the College in procuring Donations, and excited the King of Spain to settle a Pension upon it (which cannot easily be made appear), that Pension was but a very slippery Foundation, only paid for a few Years, and has been intermitted ever since Dr. Worthington was President of the College; which is an evident Token upon what Account it was paid, viz., to support the Jesuits' Interest, whilst they had a Finger in the Pye, and enjoyed the Privilege of furnishing the Clergy with what Superiors they pleased. For when this Oeconomy was changed, there was no more to be heard of the Spanish Pension." This is the case which Father Hicks must answer, but concerning which he has as yet been silent. It is easy to show that Father Persons was generous to Douay, but not so easy to prove that his generosity was really disinterested. So long as this point remains unproven, the hostility of the Appellant Priests to Father Persons can easily be explained. One need not resort, as does Father Hicks, to insinuations against their faith. The simplest explanation of their conduct—and it was also their own explanation—is that they considered Persons' generosity as being primarily a matter of policy. For such generosity they saw no reason to be grateful.

Father Leo Hicks' June article is devoted to the beginnings of the College of Valladolid. Archbishop Goodier gives us a charming characterization of St. Robert Bellarmine as Defender of the Faith. The account given of the activities of *The Catholic Action Society* will repay careful reading and will certainly suggest imitation. Father Joseph Keating's analysis of the negotiations of *Anglicans and Orthodox* was well worth making. The same subject is treated by Père Janin in the April *ECHOS D'ORIENT: Les Orthodoxes à la Conférence de Lambeth*: it is a careful objective account of what took place, and of the reactions produced in the Near East. The Birth Control decision cooled off Athenian enthusiasm. The most active hostility to the Anglican approach is to be found in Roumania.

IN THOUGHT (June, 1931) Fr. Joseph H. Ledit, S.J., writes on *Russia tries Capitalism*, and gives us some idea of the proceedings at the Executive Committee of the Communist Party

assembled in general convention for the discussion of the present development of Soviet economy (January 4-10, 1931). "As the programme for putting Russia on a machine basis goes forward, efficiency becomes increasingly difficult. For in every one of the several communized areas, the government must not only supply and regulate machinery, which means either government purchase of foreign-built machinery, or the creation of domestic factories and provision for all raw materials necessary to make machines,—the government must also supply cattle and make provision for supporting herds, maintain a system of transport, provide workers with clothing, food and lodging, take care of the children, since even mothers of families in the Soviet economy are to be employed directly in common labour. It is not hard to understand that all this complicated supervision will require the nicest management, for not by mere dictatorial fiat are 150,000,000 men, women and children organized to labour efficiently in a delicately articulated industrial scheme. Such a general plan for regulating communized toil on communized land and in communized factories was in 1928 projected for a period of five years and hence the name, the Five-Year Plan."

The JUNE RECHERCHES DE SCIENCE RELIGIEUSE devotes two articles to the commemoration of the Council of Ephesus: Père Adhémar d'Alès treats of the peacemaking subsequent to the Council: *Le Symbole d'Union de l'Année 433*, and Père Galtier *Le Centenaire d'Ephèse* brings out very strongly the way in which Rome emphasized to the end her agreement with St. Cyril in his vindication of the faith in the divinity of Mary's Son. What he did at Ephesus was what Rome had commanded: the immediate approval of the Legates and their common action which ultimately assured Cyril's triumph, attest the continuation of complete harmony of teaching. In the final judgment of history this continued approval of Rome must be given more weight than has usually been allowed to it. *L'Argument des deux glaives* (Lue xxii, 38) *dans les controverses politiques du Moyen Age: Ses origines et son développement*, by Père Joseph Leclerc, is a most interesting account of the exegesis of "the two swords" from the question put by Charlemagne to Alcuin in 798, down to the use of the allegory by Boniface VIII in the Bull *Unam Sanctam* (November 18th, 1302).

ETUDES (5 Juin) devotes its *Causerie de Morale* to a very careful study of *l'Eugénique et l'Eugénisme Anglo-Saxonne devant la Morale Catholique*: and arrives at conclusions which demand the attention of our Moralists.

The NOUVELLE REVUE THEOLOGIQUE (Juin, 1931) has an able article, by Père Hocedez, on *Sacraments and Magic*, based upon a careful study of anti-Catholic literature it leads up to a useful exposition of the fact that the *Magical rite and the Sacrament have nothing in common*. Père Creusen's commentary on the Decree of the Holy Office on Sex Education is noteworthy.

ANTONIANUM (Quarterly, 35 lire, Rome: 124 via Merulana) devotes its third number to a Latin account of the life, iconography, office and works of St. Antony of Padua. The separate number costs 18 lire.

ETUDES FRANCISCAINES (Mai-Juin) contains an interesting account of the struggle of Bishop de Cherbonnal in the middle of the nineteenth century for the maintenance of separate Catholic Schools in Upper Canada.

The BUCKFAST ABBEY CHRONICLE (June, 1931) contains a meditation on the Joy of the Christian, *Christianus Gaudens*, by Abbot Vonier; a biographical sketch of Bishop Barrett of Plymouth; an article by Abbot Cabrol on *Saint John the Baptist*. Dom John Stéphen continues his account of the pioneer work of the Spanish Benedictines in Western Australia: *New Norcia*.

THE AUSTRALASIAN CATHOLIC RECORD (Quarterly; 15s a year. St. Patrick's College, Manly., N.S.W.) has a very useful account of *Konnorsreuth*, by Fr. Hogan, O.P. Fr. Lane treats at some length the *Duties of Catholic Members of Parliament*, in view of a party pledged to secular education and to sterilization of the unfit. Archbishop Sheehan has some illuminating notes on de la Taille, Marin-Sola, and Adam's Spirit of Catholicism.

The BULLETIN DE LITTERATURE ECCLESIASTIQUE (Mars-Avril) is of interest from cover to cover. *L'Affaire Calas*, by Fr. Bousquet, reduces that sordid law-suit to its historical importance, and it is seen to be something quite different from the anti-Protestant intrigue conjured up by the magic of Voltaire's pen: the trial was a perfectly fair one, the accused was found guilty of murder, and his Protestantism had nothing to do with the verdict. Père Dudon places on record a number of historical details shedding light on *Les Origines françaises du Décret "Lamentabili."* The idea originated with M. Letourneau, curé de Saint Sulpice early in 1903; he worked at the compilation of a series of propositions taken from M. Loisy's works, together with Père Bouvier, S.J., with the approval of Cardinal Perraud, Bishop of Autun. The first series of eighteen propositions translated into Latin were submitted to Father Billot. After many revisions the work was handed over to Cardinal Richard in October, 1903. It was at once taken to Rome and Pius X himself passed it on to the Holy Office. But it was only on July 3rd, 1907, that the Holy Office published its Decree—wider indeed in scope than that submitted from Paris—but embodying the suggested text of many condemned propositions.

CORRESPONDENCE

NON-FASTING SECOND MASS.

A parish priest is taken ill when just about to depart for Mass at a chapel of ease two miles away, where seventy persons attend Mass. The only other priest available has already taken the Ablutions. *Quaeritur*:

- (1) May this priest lawfully say the Mass at the chapel of ease?
- (2) May it be taken as a general rule that one is justified in saying a second Mass in similar circumstances?

REPLY

As the case is stated, and if no special circumstances enter into it, the answer to the first question must be in the negative. The Holy Office, when asked: "*Num ob rationem scandalum vel admirationis possit unquam celebrari secunda Missa post primam cum jam fractum est jejunium?*" replied, "Negative" (2nd December, 1874). For of the two ecclesiastical laws that are in question in the case, viz., the law of the eucharistic fast and the precept of hearing Mass on Sundays and Holydays (it is presumed that the case refers to Mass on a day of precept), the law of the eucharistic fast is graver than the precept of hearing Mass, and therefore prevails (cfr. Noldin, *De Sacramentis*, n. 153). Even if the omission of Mass at the chapel of ease is likely to be the cause of some "scandal or admiration," we are instructed by the Holy Office in the reply quoted above that this is not sufficient reason for a non-fasting Mass.

But Génicot (Casus, II, p. 225) is of opinion that the coupling together of the words "scandal or admiration" in this query shows that the Holy Office is speaking of *scandal* not in the strict sense, but in the wide sense which covers much the same ground as the word *admiratio*. And this view would appear to be justified. About more serious scandal we will speak later. But if the omission of the Mass is likely to produce no worse effect than a certain amount of surprise and harmless talk, the priest can explain to the congregation why there is no Mass, and that in the circumstances the precept of hearing Mass does not bind them for that day. In the circumstances of our case, we cannot see that any more serious consequences than these are likely to ensue. The people should be told plainly that their priest is too ill to say Mass, that no other priest is available to do so, and that consequently they are released from the obligation of hearing Mass for that day (presuming that they cannot well attend Mass elsewhere, cfr. *infra*); and they would be unreasonable indeed, if they were not satisfied with the explanation. Nay, rather, we can readily imagine that the congregation, or at any rate the more instructed section of it, would, if the fact came to their knowledge, be far more shocked that a priest who was not fasting had said Mass for them in the place of their sick pastor, than by the omission of Mass on that day. We conclude, therefore, that it would not be lawful for a priest who had broken his fast to say Mass in the circumstances of the case.

But from his second question our correspondent evidently desires us to deal with the more general question—whether a priest who

regularly duplicates on Sundays is justified in saying the second Mass even though he has through inadvertence broken his fast by taking the ablutions at the first Mass. This question cannot be answered by a universal *Yes* or *No*. The answer depends on the circumstances of the particular case. If the only effect of omitting the second Mass would be, besides the congregation's loss of Mass on that day, merely a certain amount of *admiratio* and friendly gossip, there would not be sufficient reason for a breach of the law of the eucharistic fast, as we have already shown from the answer of the Holy Office.

If, however, there is good ground for the fear that the omission of the Mass will have more serious results, viz., will cause grave scandal or other spiritual danger to the people, or the defamation of the priest, loss of prestige or esteem, the prohibition does not apply, and the priest may say the Mass. "Si majora et insolita timenda sunt detrimenta, utputa murmuraciones plebis contra parochum, quasi ob socordiam celebrare omitteret, vel peccata multorum qui, cum possent aliam Missam in eadem vel in vicina ecclesia audire, praevideantur hoc officium neglecturi, censemur presbyterum jam sufficientem habuisse rationem Sacri iterandi" (Génicot, l.c.). In the case as stated, the Mass was to have been said in a chapel of ease two miles away; so it may be inferred that the people concerned had no other opportunity of hearing Mass on that day, and consequently that the precept ceased to bind them for that occasion. But if this had happened in a large town parish, and later Masses could easily be heard either in the same church or in some neighbouring church, it is clear that the precept of hearing Mass would continue to bind the assembled congregation; and if the priest omitted that particular Mass, they would be obliged (unless special circumstances excused individuals) to seek another Mass. The point that theologians have in mind (e.g., Génicot, l.c., Noldin, l.c., Lehmkühl, II, n. 162) is that if the observance of the ecclesiastical law of the eucharistic fast is likely to be a cause of scandal or other occasion of sin to the people, there is conflict between the divine law and the ecclesiastical law, and the divine law of removing or avoiding scandal and danger of sin overrules the ecclesiastical precept, and consequently the Mass in such circumstances may be said though the priest has broken his fast.—"Non adeo raro ratio scandali adesse potest, quia nimirum facile praevidetur gravis populi offensio, periculum gravis suspicionis vel dieterii contra sacerdotem, aut periculum ne complures, quamquam possint et debeant alio se conferre ad audiendam Missam, ex inopinato illo casu ansam sumant cum peccato gravi Missam negligendi: quodsi haec juste timentur—non solum populi admiratio—videtur lex naturalis scandala praecavendi gravius urgere quam ecclesiastica lex de jejuniis naturali lata" (Lehmkühl, l.c.).

This is the principle on which the Holy Office bases the decree of 22nd March, 1923, in which the Holy See announced that dispensations from the eucharistic fast would in certain circum-

stances be granted to priests, and also gave to the Bishops the faculty to dispense in urgent cases: "Ne forte ex lege ecclesiastica qua reali corpori Christi debitum praestatur obsequium, corpus Christi mysticum seu animarum salus detrimentum capiat." The case we are now considering does not fall under the terms of this decree, but the principle, "ne animarum salus detrimentum capiat," is the same; and we may argue from analogy that if there is time to consult the Bishop in the difficulty (usually, however, there will *not* be time), it should be done, and his approval obtained. But it is essential that each case should be judged in its own particular circumstances: "In singulis casibus prudenti iudicio relinquendum est, num putetur ex Missa non celebrata aliquod grave scandalum secuturum esse" (Lehmkuhl, l.c.).

To sum up: "Celebrare licebit sacerdos qui imprudens post mediam noctem aliquod sumpsit, si Missam absque populi scandalo, offensione, dictariis et similibus omittere nequit. . . . Non sufficit tamen sola ratio quod populus die festivo Missa careret. Ita saltem juxta communem sententiam: sed benignior opinio non est improbabilis" (Génicot, Theol. Moral., II, n. 202 bis, 4°).

Perhaps we may be allowed to mention a case that came within our own experience. One Sunday a parish priest forgetfully took the ablutions at the first Mass; and when the time for the second Mass arrived, after the *Asperges* he explained the situation to the people, telling them that he had taken the ablutions at the first Mass, and, having thereby broken his fast, he could not say the second Mass, but would instead say the Mass prayers with the congregation. This he did; and, having preached his sermon, dismissed them. It was not long, however, before one heard that it had been said that "Father N. had been unable to say Mass last Sunday *because he could not get absolution.*" There is no knowing what terrible crime may have finally been attributed to the poor priest. *Crescit eundo*, like the snowball. Of course, in this particular instance the trouble would have been avoided if the unfortunate word "ablutions" had not been used; but once talk and criticism begin, no one can tell where they will stop, and what misunderstandings and false judgments will result.

C. J. CRONIN.

CASUS.

Re the Promises *made in Cn. 1061, 2* about *Universa Prole*, I submit that it would help those who have to deal with *Ne Temere* Mixed Religious Cases if a more carefully worded Form were put into use. The words, ". . . of both sexes who *may be born* of our marriage . . ." led some people to suppose that those children (even under seven years of age) already born do not come under the promise, whereas it seems Canon 1061 makes no distinction. If you could see your way to making reference to this matter in your correspondence pages I believe you would help many.

REPLY.

The essential point which our correspondent desires to draw attention to is this: In cases of the convalidation of clandestine mixed marriages already contracted (commonly, but incorrectly,

called *Ne temere* cases), are *all* the children, even those born before the convalidation, to be regarded as included in the promise that "all the children who may be born of our marriage" shall be baptized and brought up in the Catholic religion? And consequently, is the parish-priest bound to require this, as a condition of convalidating the marriage?

My answer to these two questions is, without hesitation, in the affirmative. It is true that none of the authors whom I have been able to consult, deals with the point; but I imagine that this is because it never occurred to them that the universality of the promise as required in Canon 1061, §1, 2°, of the Codex, could suffer any limitation: "*Cautionem praestiterit . . . uterque conjux de universa prole catholicis tantum baptizanda et educanda.*" "*Universa proles*" surely means all the children born to that couple.

The fundamental reason for this is that a grave obligation of the divine law binds all to bring up their children in the true religion of Christ, and consequently the Church cannot and will not countenance the union of a Catholic and non-Catholic unless the Catholic baptism and upbringing of all their children is guaranteed.

To this it might perhaps be replied that while the obligation of the divine law exists with regard to the children already born to the couple, it does not follow that the fulfilment of the obligation should be made a condition of the convalidation of the marriage, because these children, being already born, are independent of the marriage, I answer that this is not true. The Catholic marriage is in this case the convalidation of the previous invalid, because clandestine, marriage, and therefore gives it canonical efficacy as regards the children already born. For Canon 1116 lays it down that the subsequent convalidation legitimates the children born of the irregular union, provided that the parents were free to marry; and Canon 1117 declares that "*Filii legitimati per subsequens matrimonium, ad effectus canonicos quod attinet, in omnibus, aequiparantur legitimis.*" The children in question, therefore, are canonically children of the convalidated marriage; and they have the rights of the children of the marriage, and particularly to Catholic baptism and to a Catholic education, and the parents have a grave obligation to give these to them. And the Church must see that they get them.

The form quoted by our correspondent—"all the children . . . who may be born of our marriage"—is strictly correct, and is retrospective in its obligation. I know at least one diocese where it is expressed somewhat differently: "We . . . promise and engage that, in case of our marriage, all the children of both sexes who may be born to us, etc." But the meaning and obligation are precisely the same.

We have hitherto assumed, in accordance with our correspondent's suggestion, that the children in question are entirely in the power and under the control of the parents as regards their religion and education. But when a child attains the use

of reason, he becomes canonically an adult (Can. 745, 2, 2°), and is therefore *sui juris* in the affairs of his soul. Consequently the parents may not force the Catholic religion on such children. They cannot be made Catholics against their will, but must be properly instructed and allowed freedom of consent in the matter (Can. 752). All that we can say about the duty of Catholic parents in such cases is that they must do their best legitimately and prudently to bring their children to a willing profession of the Catholic faith. If the children are of school age, and so under the authority of their parents as regards education, the parents are bound to send them to a Catholic school and to give them every opportunity of learning the Catholic faith and religion. And for all their children, of whatever age they are bound to do all they can, by prayer and example, and by the legitimate and prudent exercise of that influence which they rightly and properly possess, to make reparation for their past grave negligence or worse, and to fulfil the primary duty of a parent to give his child every possible opportunity of working out his eternal salvation.

C. J. CRONIN.

PERMISSU SUPERIORUM.

